Abstract
We analyze the implications of environmental policy on pollution in a stochastic framework with finite horizon and sustainability concern. The social planner seeks to minimize the social (environmental and economic) costs associated with pollution. We allow for the planner to attach different relative weights to the discounted and end-of-planning-horizon costs in order to assess how sustainability concern might affect the optimal level of policy intervention. We show that the optimal environmental policy increases with the degree of sustainability concern, reducing thus the amount of pollution the society is forced to bear. A calibration based on world \(\textit{CO}_2\) data supports our conclusions, further highlighting the importance of higher degrees of sustainability concern to achieve greener long run outcomes. It also allows us to show that under a realistic model’s parametrization the optimal environmental policy tends to rise with higher degrees of uncertainty in a precautionary manner.
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Notes
Very few papers analyze economic dynamics in a framework of stochastic pollution (Kijima et al. 2011; Saltari and Travaglini 2011; Privileggi and Marsiglio 2013). However, differently from our goals, these works either do not focus on environmental policy (Privileggi and Marsiglio 2013), or take it exogenously given (Kijima et al. 2011) or assume the evolution of pollution to be completely exogenous (Saltari and Travaglini 2011).
Specifically, the presence of a positive discount factor (a necessarily requirement of any infinite horizon optimal control problem) is the source of the problem. Indeed, a positive discount factor means that less and less weight is attached to generations further away in the future, thus the notion of intertemporal equity is automatically ruled out.
Strictly related to our approach, even if with different objectives and methodologies, see recently Colapinto et al. (2015). They propose a multicriteria model in order to assess the implications of different degrees of sustainability concern on the optimal dynamics of economic policy and natural resources.
Such an assumption that capital accumulation is completely exogenous is clearly a simplification of reality, but it is instrumental to the need of developing a tractable model. Allowing for a more sophisticated and endogenously determined capital accumulation as in van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) will substantially complicate the analysis. Note that even in its current form the problem is all but trivial (see Proposition 1), thus extending the analysis to consider a richer dynamic evolution of capital will make the search for an explicit solution of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation even harder. It seems convenient to start the analysis of uncertainty related issues in the simplest possible pollution control problem.
Note that our pollution specification suggests that the growth rate of pollution and the growth rate of output are related one-for-one by a factor \(\eta \). This is in line with a common approach in literature where pollution is often assumed to be proportional to output or capital (see Dinda 2005; Economides and Philippopoulos 2008), meaning that the growth rate of pollution is proportional to the growth rate of output, which is equal to the growth rate of capital in our setup. This assumption implies that economic activities through the production process are the primary source of pollution.
Note that this new formulation precludes us to analyze the case in which \(\theta =0\), which as we will discuss more in depth later, represents a framework consistent with Chichilnisky et al.’s (1995) green golden rule. However, from a calculus of variations exercise it is straightforward to show that in the \(\theta =0\) case, the problem (1), (2) and (3) admits the trivial solution \(\tau _t^*=\tau ^*=1, \forall t\). Intuitively, if the long run cost of pollution is the unique concern it is optimal to reduce pollution as much as possible; since the short term economic costs are not considered, this can be done by relying on a maximal value of the policy instrument at any point in time.
Note that, because of what intuitively just discussed and what mentioned earlier, the \(\theta =0\) case represents a degenerate case giving rise to a trivial solution in which the optimal level of policy intervention is always maximal, that is \(\tau ^*=1, \forall t\), even in absence of shocks.
The standard benchmark for thinking about what the excess of capital growth function might look like is to imagine \(\gamma _t\) to be decreasing over time. This is due to the fact that in a typical macroeconomic setup the evolution of capital may be described by a Bernoulli differential equation. This is clearly what we may expect in a Solow-type (1956) framework in which capital dynamics is driven by the economy’s saving behavior, but also in a Ramsey-type (1928) setting in which consumption is endogenously determined the (optimal) capital dynamics would be very similar. In our model, we cannot formally take into account either saving or other determinants of capital accumulation, thus we simply focus on a time-varying capital dynamics to summarize the implications of the relevant macroeconomic factors.
Note that the bounds are dependent upon \(\theta \), thus in order to plot in the same figure the optimal tax rate associated with different values of the degree of sustainability concern, we show only the minimum and the maximum of the lower and upper bounds, respectively.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Optimal Solution and Sufficiency
By denoting with \(\mathcal {J}(t,p_t)\) the value function associated to our stochastic problem (4), (5) and (6) and by omitting the time subscript for sake of clarity, the HJB equation reads as:
while the corresponding terminal condition as:
The first order necessary (and sufficient; see below) condition for \(\tau \) yields:
We proceed by guessing the form of the value function and verifying that our guess is correct. Our sophisticated guess is:
where V is a variable to be determined. By computing its derivatives:
and substituting (25) into (22), we obtain:
By plugging (24), (25) and (26) into (20) and simplifying the expression, we obtain the following ordinary differential equation in V:
with the boundary condition \(V_T=\frac{1-\theta }{\theta } \ge 0\), from evaluating (21) and (23) at T. The solution of the above differential equation can be used to derive the path of the optimal tax rate [from (27)] and finally the expected path of pollution [from (5)]. Indeed, by solving (28) along with its boundary condition for \(V_t\) and substituting into (27) we get the optimal dynamics of the tax rate:
where \(M=[2(\eta -\delta )+ \sigma ^2-\rho ]^2+4\eta ^2\), \(\tanh (z)=(e^z-e^{-z})/(e^z+e^{-z})\) is the hyperbolic tangent function and \({{\mathrm{arctanh}}}(z)=\frac{1}{2}[\log (1+z)-log(1-z)]\), with \( -1<z<1\), its inverse. By plugging the above expression in (5), which describes a geometric Brownian motion with time-dependent coefficients, it is possible to determine the time evolution of pollution, whose closed form expression is given in Eq. (11).
In order to verify the correctness of our guess, we use the stochastic maximum principle proposed by Framstad et al. (2004) to show that the policy rule identified in (29) is optimal. By defining \(m_t \equiv \partial \mathcal {J}/ \partial p\) and \(n_t \equiv \partial ^2 \mathcal {J} / \partial p^2\), it is possible to rewrite (20) as:
where:
where denotes the the stochastic Hamiltonian. Theorem 2.1 of Framstad et al. (2004) states that, for an admissible set of state and controls, if the minimized Hamiltonian \(\hat{\mathcal {H}}\) (that is the Hamiltonian \(\mathcal {H}\) evaluated at the value of the optimal control \(\tau ^*\)) is convex in p for all t in [0, t], then the pair \((\tau ^*, p)\) represents an optimal pair for the problem. Note that \(\mathcal {H}\) is strictly convex in \(\tau \) since \( \partial ^2 \mathcal {H}/ \partial \tau ^2 =p^2e^{-\rho t } > 0\). The control which minimizes \(\mathcal {H}\) is given by Eq. (22) and so the minimized Hamiltonian is:
which is strictly convex in p, since \( \partial ^2 \hat{\mathcal {H}}/ \partial p^2= e^{-\rho t}+ n\sigma ^2 >0\).
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
The derivative of the optimal policy \(\tau ^*\) with respect to \(\theta \) reads as:
where \(M=[2(\eta -\delta )+ \sigma ^2-\rho ]^2+4\eta ^2\) and \(B=2(1-\theta )\eta ^{2} -2(\eta -\delta )\theta +\rho \theta -\sigma ^2\theta \). The sign of the above derivative is determined by the product of three terms, \(\frac{\sqrt{M}}{2}\) and the two terms in the curly brackets. Provided that the hyperbolic tangent function is well defined, as per condition (9), the first term, \(\frac{\sqrt{M}}{2}\), is clearly non-negative. The second term, namely \(\left\{ 1- \tanh \left[ \frac{\sqrt{M}}{2}(T-t) +{{\mathrm{arctanh}}}\left( \frac{B}{\sqrt{M}}\right) \right] ^{2}\right\} \), is non-negative too since the hyperbolic tangent takes values in \([-1,1]\). After some algebra, the third term, \(\left\{ \left( \frac{-2\eta ^2-\sigma ^2+2\delta -2\eta +\rho }{\theta \sqrt{M}}-\frac{B}{\theta ^2 \sqrt{M}}\right) \left[ (1-\frac{B}{\theta ^2 (\sqrt{M})^2})\eta \right] ^{-1}\right\} \), can be rearranged to obtain:
Since the numerator in (32) is clearly non-negative, the sign of its denominator determines the sign of (31): if this is positive then the whole derivative will be negative, while it will be positive otherwise. It turns out that the conditions for the hyperbolic tangent function to be well defined, as in Eq. (9), ensure that the denominator of the above expression is positive, such that the sign of (31) is overall negative.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3
From Eq. (10) it is clear that what complicates the determination of the sign of \(\frac{\partial \tau ^*}{\partial \sigma ^2}\) is the argument of the inverse hyperbolic tangent. Indeed, apart from this term whose derivative has an uncertain sign, all other terms suggest the existence of a monotonically increasing relationship between the optimal taxation and the degree of uncertainty. Thus, we can undoubtedly assess the sign of \(\frac{\partial \tau ^*}{\partial \sigma ^2}\) only whenever also the argument of the inverse hyperbolic tangent rises with \(\sigma ^2\). In the following we denote the argument of the inverse hyperbolic tangent with \(\Omega \), which from Eq. (10) reads as:
After some algebra the derivative of the above term with respect to \(\sigma ^2\) yields:
Since the denominator in above expression is clearly non-negative, the sign of its numerator determines the sign of \(\frac{\partial \Omega }{\partial \sigma ^2}\): whenever this is negative then the whole derivative will be positive. This happens whenever the condition stated in Proposition 3, \(\sigma ^2 \le \rho -2(\eta -\delta )-\frac{2\theta }{1-\theta }\), holds.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4
Let us first notice that the following equation:
admits a closed-form solution given by:
By repeating the same calculations as in Sect. 3, one can reduce the problem of solving the HJB equation to the following ordinary differential equation:
where \(\gamma _t\) measures the excess of capital growth. Some algebra yields to the following inequalities:
and, in an analogous way:
By using the above Eq. (33) and the classical comparison theorem for differential equations, we obtain the lower and upper bounds as in (18) and (19).
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La Torre, D., Liuzzi, D. & Marsiglio, S. Pollution Control Under Uncertainty and Sustainability Concern. Environ Resource Econ 67, 885–903 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0010-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0010-x