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Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states

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Abstract

Several theories suggest that states’ choices of constitutional rules are at least partially a function of neighboring constitutions. This paper provides the first analysis of spatial dependence of specific provisions within state constitutions in the United States. The analysis effectively makes constitutional rules endogenous, contributing to a relatively underdeveloped branch of constitutional economics. By employing a series of probit estimations of nineteen specific constitutional rules, I find evidence of spatial dependence in state constitutions. Specifically, the presence of specific constitutional constraints pertaining to term limits, supreme court justice selection, recall, home rule, direct democracy, constitutional amendment by convention, balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limits, line item veto, victims’ bill of rights, health and welfare, right to privacy, environmental protection, sex discrimination, abortion, and official language all exhibit some evidence spatial dependence.

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Notes

  1. An interesting unit of analysis for the study of this phenomenon would be cities which form along a state’s border. While such an undertaking is beyond the scope of the present paper, it would likely prove to be a worthwhile avenue for future research. I thank Donald Lacombe for this insight.

  2. If X i is expressed in relative terms, it is not necessary to include X −i in Eq. 2.

  3. Contiguity is determined using latitude and longitude coordinates and Delaunay triangles.

  4. For example, the elements of w corresponding to Florida and Georgia takes a value of ‘1’ (since they share a common border) while the elements corresponding to Florida and Texas takes a value of ‘0’ (since they do not share a common border).

  5. In general, former Confederate States have had a far greater number of constitutions than similarly-aged Northern states. Confederate States each adopted new constitutions following secession, asserting their place in the newly formed Confederate States of America. Following the end of the American Civil War, these states again adopted new constitutions rejoining the United States. Many adopted yet another constitution following Reconstruction.

  6. A full description of the Gibbs sampler and Bayesian econometric technique employed is well beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is pointed to LeSage and Pace (2009) who provide a full treatment of the methodology. Fiva and Rattsø (2007) also provide an excellent summary of the procedure.

  7. A full treatment of the Bayesian estimation of the spatial autoregressive probit model can be found in LeSage and Pace (2009) Chapter 10. The models were estimated using the ‘sarp_g’ function found in LeSage’s spatial econometrics toolbox, available at http://www.spatial-econometrics.com.

  8. While the results are nearly identical, the time needed for computation increases greatly. As such, I present the results based on fewer MCMC draws as my primary findings.

  9. Diffuse priors are also known as uninformative priors and indicate uncertainty about the expected values of the parameters. Specifically, the assumed prior mean for the β coefficients is zero, the prior variance of β is very large, and the parameter ρ has a range of [−1,1]. For more information on the role of priors in Bayesian estimation, see LeSage and Pace (2009).

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Acknowledgments

I thank Russell Sobel, Scott Beaulier, Brian Cushing, Tami Gurley-Calvez, Donald Lacombe, James LeSage, Santiago Pinto, William Reece, two anonymous referees, and participants at the 2011 meetings of the Public Choice Society in San Antonio, TX, and Association of Private Enterprise Education in Nassau, Bahamas for helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Manuel H. Johnson Center for Political Economy, Sorrell College of Business, Troy University, Troy, AL, 36082, USA

    George R. Crowley

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Correspondence to George R. Crowley.

Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6 Spatial Durbin probit models: government structure (alternative weight matrix)
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Table 7 Spatial Durbin probit models: fiscal and social constraints (alternative weight matrix)
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Crowley, G.R. Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states. Const Polit Econ 23, 134–165 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-012-9117-4

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