Abstract
This article proposes a specific logic of dynamics for integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) that combines two empirically oriented process extensions strengthening concreteness of Donaldson and Dunfee’s conceptualization, namely (1) international policy regime theory and (2) Tiebout migration. While either would help “dynamize” and “concretize” ISCT, the two combined are even more insightful. Real-world policy regime processes can develop concrete action-guiding norms instantiating hypernorms to guide business decisions. Donaldson and Dunfee placed empirical reliance on expectation of converging parallel evolution of universal principles and authentic local values. ISCT remains vague on how global or local norms can develop and change, for two reasons. First, ISCT does not explain mechanisms for how proposed hypernorms can become actual global norms and also become accepted across extant authentic communities. International policy regime theory explains how hypernorms can become instantiated as global norms expressed in policy regimes. Second, a basic element in ISCT is implied consent positing free exit from voluntary moral communities. Empirically, individuals or businesses may be unable to exit from undesired membership in authentic communities to which they do not consent. The Tiebout migration model provides valuable insights concerning how substantive mobility or its absence improves on the minimum ISCT assumption of implied consent. An integrated logic of ISCT dynamics generates a three-level framework in which instantiated hypernorms and authentic community (microsocial) norms can empirically change, and individuals or businesses can migrate more freely across extant communities.
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Notes
An anonymous reviewer suggested instantiation as a way of relating universal hypernorms to global norms. Instantiation provides an instance as concrete evidence in support of an abstract theory or concept.
“Corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development around the world” (Smith 2014). Bribery of government officials by foreign businesses causes economic harm to both developing and advanced countries through market distortions and inefficiencies and undermining of public confidence in democratic government (Dalton 2006). Dalton points out that the FCPA prohibits corrupt payments on an argument that improper influencing of government officials is morally wrong.
The anti-corruption regime does not yet resolve facilitation. The FCPA permits facilitation payments under certain conditions. The UK Bribery Act 2010 prohibits payments under all conditions.
ILO Minimum Age Convention, 1973, is interpreted as “This fundamental convention sets the general minimum age for admission to employment or work at 15 years (13 for light work) and the minimum age for hazardous work at 18 (16 under certain strict conditions). It provides for the possibility of initially setting the general minimum age at 14 (12 for light work) where the economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed.” http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/child-labour/lang--it/index.htm.
Abbreviations
- FCPA:
-
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
- ISCT:
-
Integrative social contracts theory
- UN:
-
United Nations
- UNCAC:
-
UN Convention against Corruption
- UNGC:
-
United Nations Global Compact
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Windsor, D. Dynamics for Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Norm Evolution and Individual Mobility. J Bus Ethics 149, 83–95 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3068-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3068-z