Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Universal Values and Virtues in Management Versus Cross-Cultural Moral Relativism: An Educational Strategy to Clear the Ground for Business Ethics

  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Despite the fact that business people and business students often cast doubt on the relevance of universal moral principles in business, the rejection of relativism is a precondition for business ethics to get off the ground. This paper proposes an educational strategy to overcome the philosophical confusions about relativism in which business people and students are often trapped. First, the paper provides some conceptual distinctions and clarifications related to moral relativism, particularism, and virtue ethics. More particularly, it revisits arguments demonstrating that virtues in business are not in contradiction with the relevance of universal principles, despite the fact that virtue ethics is often identified with particular relationships and contexts. It goes on to show how students and managers, but also researchers, often mix up radically different conceptions of moral relativism. It is also argued that this confusion is in part created by the cross-cultural management literature in which the methodological stance of the value-freedom of the social sciences is, in a perplexingly mistaken way, transformed into a rejection of all normative discussion and a plea for relativism. The remainder of the paper presents some tools that may be helpful in steering people toward less simplistic views about moral relativism and virtue ethics. It further argues that it is equally important to spell out that moral universalism can be understood in a humble way, without implying either arrogant ethnocentrism or omniscience, as part of an ongoing debate that progresses gradually.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I have conducted some training sessions in two different France-based multinational corporations. These sessions were attended, among others, by expatriates: buyers based in Asia (China, India, Vietnam, etc.) and people involved in production in the US, Russia, India, and China.

  2. There are exceptions. For example, the Code of Ethics of Accenture is radically universalist.

  3. At the opposite, professional business ethicists underline the need for universalist norms. Cf. Windsor (2004), Smeltzer and Jennings (1998), Wicks (1990).

  4. In fact, as an anonymous referee has pointed out, one could argue that the arrogance is not really on the side of universalism, since universalists merely claim that we cannot just decide ourselves about what is right or wrong: we are all, including the universalists themselves, subject to the same objective standards. See also “Universalism Without Arrogance” section on this.

  5. Of course, my first-hand experience of widespread moral relativism and of the more broader rejection of the relevance of abstract universal principles does not constitute scientifically established empirical evidence about how widespread moral relativism is among international managers. In addition, indeed, it would certainly be interesting to have more detailed information about the prevalence of moral relativism and about the idea that universal principles are useless to guide decisions in complex practical situations. But, in any case, the evidence is strong enough to make the case for combating relativism worthwhile.

  6. Beauchamp et al. (2009, p. 8) shortly describe the problem and mention that philosophers tend to reject relativism. Wicks et al. (2010, p. 102) reject relativism on the basis of its internal contradictions. This may convince philosophers, but the textbook does not really spell out the issue. A similar short treatment is to be found in Boatright (2009, p. 407). Crane and Matten (2010, pp. 150–153) present Hofstede’s theory, which I will discuss below, without any critical warnings. Stanwick and Stanwick (2009, pp. 204–206) also present this theory, without pointing out its limits and without even mentioning Hofstede’s name.

  7. This vision is defended by Hofstede (2001, p. 15): “Cultural relativism does not imply normlessness for oneself or for one’s own society. It does call for one to suspend judgment when dealing with groups or societies different from one’s own.”

  8. The underlying motivation to challenge superiority, though, is as such defensible and we come back on it in “Universalism Without Arrogance” section.

  9. This argument has been advanced much earlier by Williams (1972).

  10. Although some extremely sophisticated versions of moral relativism may have a point in a meta-ethical debate, they are irrelevant here insofar that their authors admit that they intrinsically are rather nonrelativist. An example is Velleman (2013).

  11. One point of discussion among utilitarians is whether or not future generations or non-human animals should be included in the universal calculus. See e.g., Singer (2011).

  12. Anscombe (1958) is considered to have triggered this revival. However, two of the main ideas that are advanced in her paper—Kant’s concept of duty and moral law as implicitly and incompletely inherited from theology, and the role of virtues in moral life—were spelled out one century earlier in Schopenhauer’s (1840) Über die Grundlage der Moral. Cf. Schopenhauer (1986 [1840]), pp. 650 ff. For a general discussion of virtue ethics in business, see Sison (2003).

  13. Dancy (2009).

  14. In general, applied ethics is anything but simply applying general principles to particular situations or resolving concrete dilemmas on the basis of some abstract principle. For a detailed argument, see MacIntyre (1984).

  15. Kant rejects the notion of eudaimonia and makes a distinction between happiness that is, according to him, self-oriented and in part empirically based, and morality that is based on pure reason. As a consequence, practical wisdom, the judgment about what we should do in our best interest (prudential reasons) is radically distinguished from morality (moral reasons). See Wood (2006) and O’Neill (1996, 2004).

  16. Russell (2009, , pp. 27 ff.)

  17. MacIntyre (2011, p. 320) argues that a virtue contributes to the good of that kind of whole human life.

  18. Aristotle, Politics 1268a39ff.

  19. See also the remarks in the postscript to the 2011 edition of After Virtue.

  20. Just to indicate how important and influential these people are in the domain of intercultural management: if you type their names on Google Scholar you will see for each of them more than 11,000 hits. Trompenaars’ Riding the Waves of Culture (co-authored with Charles Hampden-Turner) has been quoted by other scholars more than 5,000 times, and Hofstede’s Culture and Organizations even more.

  21. For a discussion of the ‘‘naturalistic fallacy,’’ see Ridge (2010).

  22. Both are inspired by the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Geertz (1973).

  23. Jackson (2011) contains a discussion of the different variations of the models that allow to compare cultures among which the models of Hofstede and the one of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, along with others.

  24. http://www2.thtconsulting.com/.

  25. http://www.geerthofstede.com/training--consulting. http://www.geerthofstede.com/training--consulting. We read on the website: “Numerous consultancies around the world use the work of Geert Hofstede, which is part of the public domain. The quality and range of applicability of their contributions, as we see it, varies widely. Three organizations have our full support based on their extensive experience, professionalism and thorough knowledge of Geert's work. These consultancies have regular contacts on content with Geert and Gert Jan. They are ITAP, headquartered in the U.S.A., itim international, headquartered in Sweden, and itim focus, based in the Netherlands and Finland”

  26. See http://geert-hofstede.com/.

  27. Vitell et al. (1993) have argued, in a programmatic theoretical paper, that Hofstede’s model of intercultural comparisons could be helpful to examine, empirically, the influence of culture in ethical decision making. Since then, the framework, as well as the competing one developed by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, has been used in this perspective. Axinn et al. (2004), Blodgett et al. (2001), Christie et al. (2003), Davis and Ruhe (2003), Kim and Kim (2010), Lu et al. (1999), Oumlil and Balloun (2009), Tavakoli et al. (2003), and Thorne and Bartholomew Saunders (2002) are all based on or referring to the work of Hofstede. Many articles have even ‘‘Hofstede’’ or ‘‘Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’’ in their title (Cf. French et al. 2001). Jackson (2011) gives many more references.

  28. For the methodological debate, see Bond (2002) and McSweeney (2002).

  29. Cf. Dworkin (2011) for a detailed argument that ethical skepticism necessarily implies a normative viewpoint.

  30. Dworkin (2011).

  31. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2266689/Cancer-victim-growing-new-nose-arm-Businessman-lost-organ-disease-hopes-new-sewn-face.html.

  32. Hofstede (2001, p. 297): “Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: Both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.”

  33. On how moral skepticism is at some point self-refuting, see Schafer-Landau (2003).

  34. Velleman (2013) himself admits that his form of relativism will be considered by most relativists as nonrelativist since he accepts notions like progress and backwardness. He is relativist in the very broad sense that moral judgments are always made from some human perspective. Just like a heavy stone is ‘‘heavy’’ on earth but weightless in the outer space or even heavier on mars, moral judgments are linked to a human perspective. Therefore, morality is not universal but ubiquitous on earth (2013, p. 63). In business ethics, such distinctions do not matter.

  35. Herodotus, The histories, Book 3, 38.

  36. We come back on this idea of variations below.

  37. These ideas have been pointed out by Moody-Adams (1997, pp. 85–86).

  38. See the discussion with Singer on. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bi81JcddWc.

  39. See Prochnau and Parker (2008). One can also listen to http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103569364.

  40. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvatore_Cancemi. And the further references there.

  41. See Eze (1998).

  42. See Hursthouse (1991) for a comparison among consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics in this respect.

References

  • Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33(124), 1–19. (Reprinted from by Virtue Ethics, pp. 26–44, by R. Crisp & M. Slote, Eds., 1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press.)

  • Axinn, C., Blair, M., Heorhiadi, A., & Thach, S. (2004). Comparing ethical ideologies across cultures. Journal of Business Ethics, 54, 103–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beauchamp, T., Bowie, N., & Arnold, D. (2009). Ethical theory and business. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bicchieri, C. (1990). Norms of cooperation. Ethics, 100, 838–861.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blodgett, J. G., Rose, L.-C., Lu, G. M., & Vitell, S. J. (2001). Ethical sensitivity to stakeholder interests. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 29(2), 190–202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boatright, J. (2009). Ethics and the conduct of business. London: Pearson International.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bond, M. H. (2002). Reclaiming the individual From Hofstede’s ecological analysis—a 20-year odyssey: Comment on Oyserman et al. Psychological Bulletin, 128(1), 73–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christie, P., Kwon, I., Stoeberl, P., & Baumhart, R. (2003). A cross-cultural comparison of ethical attitudes of business managers: India, Korea and the United States. Journal of Business Ethics, 46, 263–287.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crane, A., & Matten, D. (2010). Business ethics: Managing corporate citizenship and sustainability in the age of globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crisp, R., & Slote, M. (Eds.). (1997). Virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Dancy, J. (2009). Moral particularism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2009 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/moral-particularism/.

  • Davidson, D. (1984). On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Inquiries into truth and interpretation (pp. 183–198). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Davis, J., & Ruhe, J. (2003). Perceptions of country corruption: Antecedents and outcomes. Journal of Business Ethics, 43(4), 275–288.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duska, R. (1991). What’s the point of a business ethics course? Business Ethics Quarterly, 1(4), 335–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engelen, P.-J., & Van Liedekerke, L. (2007). The ethics of insider trading revisited. Journal of Business Ethics, 74, 497–507.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eze, E. C. (1998). African philosophy. An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankena, W. (1973). Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, W., Zeiss, H., & Scherer, A. (2001). Intercultural discourse ethics: Testing Trompenaars’ and Hampden-Turner’s conclusions about Americans and the French. Journal of Business Ethics, 34, 145–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geertz, C. (1973). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. In The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays (pp. 3–30). New York: Basic Books.

  • Gert, B. (1984). Moral theory and applied ethics. The Monist, 67(4), 532–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gowans, C. (2012). Moral relativism. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2012 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/moral-relativism/.

  • Hartman, E. (2000). Socratic ethics and the challenge of globalization. Business Ethics Quarterly, 10(1), 211–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hofstede, G. (1996). Riding the waves of commerce: A test of Trompenaars’ model of national culture differences. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20, 189–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G.-J., & Minkov, M. (2010 [1991]). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London: McGraw-Hill.

  • Hursthouse, R. (1991). Virtue ethics and abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20, 223–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, T. (2011). International management ethics. A critical, cross-cultural perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I. (1996 [1785]). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. In Kant’s practical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Kim, Y., & Kim, S.-Y. (2010). The influence of cultural values on perceptions of corporate social responsibility: Application of Hofstede’s dimensions to Korean public relations practitioners. Journal of Business Ethics, 91, 485–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kluckhohn, F., & Strodtbeck, F. (1961). Variations in value orientations. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lu, L.-C., Rose, G. M., & Blodgett, J. G. (1999). The effects of cultural dimensions on the ethical decision making in marketing: An exploratory study. Journal of Business Ethics, 18, 91–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lutz, D. (2009). African Ubuntu philosophy and global management. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 313–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, A. (1984). Does applied ethics rest on a mistake? The Monist, 67(4), 498–513.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre, A. (2006). Moral relativism; truth and justification. In The task of philosophy. Selected essays (Vol. 1, pp. 52–73). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • MacIntyre, A. (2011 [1981]). After virtue. A study in moral theory. London: Bloomsbury.

  • McSweeney, B. (2002). Hofstede’s model of national cultural differences and consequences: A triumph of faith—a failure of analysis. Human Relations, 55(1), 89–118.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moody-Adams, M. (1997). Fieldwork in familiar places. Morality, culture & philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  • Nussbaum, M. (1988). Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian approach. Midwest studies in Philosophy, 13, 32–50. (Reprinted from Ethical theory. An anthology, pp. 684–700, by R. Schafer-Landau, Ed., 2007, Oxford: Blackwell (references to reprint).

  • O’Neill, O. (1996). Towards justice and virtue. A constructive account of practical reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • O’Neill, O. (2004). Kant: Rationality as practical reason. In A. J. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality (pp. 93–109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oumlil, A., & Balloun, J. (2009). Ethical decision-making differences between American and Moroccan managers. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 457–478.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prochnau, W., & Parker, L. (2008, January).Trouble in paradise. Vanity Fair.

  • Ridge, M. (2010). Moral non-naturalism. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2010 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/moral-non-naturalism/.

  • Russell, D. (2009). Practical intelligence and the virtues. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schafer-Landau, R. (2003). Whatever happened to good and evil?. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schopenhauer, A. (1986). Kleinere Schriften. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (2011[1979]). Practical ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Sison, A. (2003). The moral capital of leaders: Why virtue matters. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the social contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Smeltzer, L. R., & Jennings, M. M. (1998). Why an international code of business ethics would be good for business. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(1), 57–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stanwick, P., & Stanwick, S. (2009). Understanding business ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden, R. (1986). The economics of rights, co-operation and welfare. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tavakoli, A., Keenan, J., & Crnjak-Karanovic, B. (2003). Culture and whistleblowing. An empirical study of croatian and United States management utilizing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 49–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thorne, L., & Bartholomew Saunders, S. (2002). The socio-cultural embeddedness of individuals’ ethical reasoning in organizations cross-cultural Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 35(1), 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (2012). Riding the waves of culture. Understanding diversity in global business. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing (3rd ed., 1st ed. 1993).

  • Velleman, J. D. (2013). Foundations of moral relativism. London: Open Book Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vitell, S., Nwachukwu, S., & Barnes, J. (1993). The effects of culture on ethical decision-making: An application of Hofstede’s typology. Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 753–760.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, G. (2001). Ethics programs in global businesses: Culture’s role in managing ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 30(1), 3–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wicks, A. (1990). Norman Bowie and Richard Rorty on Multinationals: Does business ethics need ‘MetaphysicalComfort?’. Journal of Business Ethics, 9(3), 191–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wicks, A., Freeman, E., Werhane, P., & Martin, K. (2010). Business ethics. A managerial Approach. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

  • Wiggins, D. (2006). Ethics. Twelve lectures in the philosophy of morality. London: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. (1972). Morality. An introduction to ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. (1981). The truth in relativism. In B. Williams (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 132–143). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Windsor, D. (2004). The development of international business norms. Business Ethics Quarterly, 14(4), 729–754.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wong, D. B. (1984). Moral relativity. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wood, A. (2006). The supreme principle of morality. In P. Guyer (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant and Modern philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Claus Dierksmeier, Johan Sandstrom, Bas van der Linden, Luc Van Liedekerke, and two anonymous referees for helpful remarks. The usual disclaimer applies.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. EDHEC Business School, 24 avenue Gustave Delory, CS 50411, 59057, Roubaix Cedex 1, France

    Geert Demuijnck

Authors
  1. Geert Demuijnck
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Geert Demuijnck.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Demuijnck, G. Universal Values and Virtues in Management Versus Cross-Cultural Moral Relativism: An Educational Strategy to Clear the Ground for Business Ethics. J Bus Ethics 128, 817–835 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2065-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2065-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation