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Democratic Agency and the Market Machine

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Abstract

The alliance of pure market economies with democratic polities has traditionally been a problematic one. It is argued that orthodox theoretical conceptualizations of market behaviour and the application of such theory to our communal lives have entrenched an incoherent alliance. In particular, the reductive mechanism characteristic of both neo-classical economic theory and its deployment in our socio-economic order has severely undermined the telic agency required for the autonomy or self-rule definitive of an authentic democratic order. Such reduction is observed to function through the disabling of the cognitive capacity of consumers and by disempowering the agency of workers such that coercion is misconceived as freely agreed contract.

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Notes

  1. For example, see Arrow (1983, 2: pp. 107–132) or Koopmans (1957, pp. 1–126). We shall follow Koopmans in a three sector definition of equilibrium among producers, consumers and resource holders.

  2. See, for example, Hodgson (2001, chaps. 6–8).

  3. See, for instance, Galbraith (1984, ch. 11), or Scitovsky (1976, p. 273).

  4. For example, see Friedman (1962, ch. X).

  5. This claim has recently been discussed within the scope of the principle of “self-ownership”. In the words of G. A. Cohen, the principle states that “Every person is morally entitled to full private property in his own person and powers. This means that each person has an extensive set of moral rights (which the law of the land may or may not recognize) over the use of the fruits of his body and capacities” (Cohen 1995, p. 127). Of course, Cohen himself is no advocate of this principle.

  6. For the libertarian position see Gauthier (1986, ch. 4), Narveson (2003, pp. 210–222), and Nozick (1974, ch. 7). For the liberal position see Nagel (1991, chs. 9 and 10).

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Correspondence to Bernard Hodgson.

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Bernard Hodgon passed away in 2009. Dennis Badeen (Symposium organizer) is the corresponding author for this paper.

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Hodgson, B. Democratic Agency and the Market Machine. J Bus Ethics 108, 3–14 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1082-8

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