Abstract
This paper accomplishes three goals. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. I show that Husserl, in 1901, describes non-intuitive meaning consciousness as a direct parallel or as a ‘mirror’ of intuitive consciousness. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like intuitions, have substance and represent their objects. I reveal that, by defining meaning acts in this way, Husserl cannot account for our experiences of countersensical, absurd, or impossible meanings. Second, I examine how Husserl came to recognize this 1901 mistake in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation (Husserliana XX-1/2). I discuss how he accordingly reformulates his understanding of non-intuitive meaning acts from the ground up in those Revisions, where this also allows for him to properly account for the experience of impossible meanings. Instead of describing them as mirrors of intuitions, Husserl takes non-intuitive meaning acts to be modifications of intuitions, where they have no substance and do not represent their objects. Finally, in the conclusion to this essay, I demonstrate how this fundamental change to his understanding of meaning consciousness forced Husserl to revise other central tenets of his philosophy, such that the trajectory of his thought can only be properly understood in light of these revisions to his theory of non-intuitive meaning consciousness.
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Notes
I provide references to the corresponding English translation where available, following a slash after the Husserliana page number. Quotes from the Logical Investigations always come from the First Edition.
In Investigations, Husserl concludes that the signitive intention is still executed during fulfilment and is not replaced by the intuition. He states, “We must; therefore, maintain that the same [signitive] act of meaning-intention, … is also part of the complex act of recognition, but that a [signitive] meaning-intention that was ‘free’ is now ‘bound’ and ‘neutralized’ in the stage of coincidence” (Hua XIX, p. 571/1970, p. 209).
Husserl writes, “It is not possible to fit intuitive acts to every signitive intention’” (Hua XIX, p. 632/1970, p. 250).
Husserl, in that chapter four, describes that I can recognize a meaning intention as ‘possible’, when I experience a categorial intuition, which fulfils the relevant signitive meaning act (Hua XIX, pp. 632–633/1970, pp. 250–251). Impossibility; however, cannot “merely be defined as a negation of possibility, but should be realized by way of peculiar phenomenological fact” (Hua XIX: 634/1970: 251). We realize the impossibility of a meaning when we “attempt to unite contents … and [during] our attempted removal of their ‘rivalry’, we experience a peculiar relationship of contents, again grounded in their specific being… It is the relationship of conflict” (Hua XIX, p. 637/1970, p. 253). Mohanty further explains this point by writing, “A compound concept is consistent if the meaning intention sustaining it has a 'fulfilling sense'; in other words, if the partial intuitions of the component meanings can be combined into a total intuition. In that case, the compound objectivity is conceivable, the essence has an ideal existence, it is a pure possibility. These three locutions amount to the same” (1999, p. 172). Carlo Ierna also discusses how Meinong’s Graz school dealt with many of these same issues in his (2019) article.
It must be noted that Husserl’s analysis of possible and impossible meanings from the Sixth Investigation has distinct goals from his pure logical grammar from the Fourth Investigation. In the latter, Husserl is not concerned with describing the fulfillment or conflict of meaning intentions, but is instead ontologically and mereologically examining the ways in which meanings themselves can be combined to form whole sensical and consistent meanings. For more information on Husserl’s 1901 pure logical grammar, see Byrne 2017c, 2018; Drummond 2007; Edie 1977; Hanna 1984. In the conclusion to this paper, I address the relationship between Husserl’s pure grammar and his study of the conscious recognition of possible and impossible meanings.
Ursula Panzer—in her introduction to Investigations—explains that Husserl employed the term ‘signitive’ to cover all different empty acts, and that “Husserl only turned against the use of the term signitive or symbolic intentions, as the term to label the whole class of ‘empty intentions’ in his lectures in Gottingen. See Ms. FI 5/llb and 13a (1908)” (1984, p. LXI n. 1).
In 1901, Husserl defines the meaning as the intentional essence of the meaning act. The intentional essence is the species of the apprehending matter and the quality of the intention (Hua XIX, pp. 431–435/1970, pp. 122–125). For more information on this idea, see Byrne 2017a, b; De Palma 2008, pp. 51–54; Soldati 2008, pp. 64–66; Urban 2018. In contrast, in his Lectures concerning the theory of meaning (Hua XVI 1973, pp. 30–38) and Ideas I (Hua III-1, pp. 56/1982, p. 51), Husserl adopts a noematic theory of meaning (Cf. Drummond 2003, pp. 126–128). I will not further discuss this shift in Husserl’s thought, from a noetic to a noematic conception of meaning, as that transition does not materially affect any of the conclusions of this paper.
To be noted is that Husserl’s descriptions of non-intuitive intentions have not been properly addressed in the literature. On the one hand, there are many scholars, who have simply misinterpreted what Husserl meant by that term. For one of the more egregious examples, Sean Kelly asserts that, for Husserl, the signitively intended sides of objects are “hypothesized but sensibly absent” (2004, 2005, p. 79). According to Kelly’s Husserl, the signitive intending of the hidden sides of objects is more cognitive than perceptual. Kelly writes, “On Husserl’s account […] I know or believe or hypothesize or expect that the object has certain hidden features, but I do not properly speaking see it as such” (2005, p. 80). The fact that such conclusions could be published speaks to the state of the scholarship on Husserl’s descriptions of non-intuitive acts.
On the other hand, it is common for scholars to accurately, but only briefly pass over Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts. For three examples, in his text from 2019, Maxime Doyon, in passing, comments on Husserl’s gradual transition away from his views concerning signitive intentions from Investigations, by examining passages from Perception and Attention and Thing and Space. Second, the volume La représentation vide, edited by Jocelyn Benoist and Jean-Francois Courtine, is ostensibly meant to address Husserl’s theory of empty representations from the Investigations and Revisions. However, as Guillaume Frechette notes in his review of the book, only Melle’s text from that edition discusses Husserl’s theory of empty representations from Revisions in detail (Frechette 2004, p. 262). Indeed, of the few scholars who have discussed Husserl’s theories of signitive and empty intentions at any length, Melle has provided the most rigorous analyses (1998, 2002). I develop my own interpretation of Husserl, in some parts, by critically engaging with Melle’s reading. For example, my discussion of Husserl’s theory of dark intentions, from Sect. 3.1, is formulated in juxtaposition to Melle’s interpretation of those acts.
These points in mind, it can be said that by accomplishing the outlined goals of the essay, I hope to fill a gap in the literature: I seek to present a most extensive account of Husserl’s conclusions about non-intuitive acts, which have often been incorrectly or insufficiently addressed in the scholarship.
In Investigations, Husserl claimed that both single rayed and categorial intentions could endow expressions with meaning or sense, where he treated those latter two terms as largely interchangeable. In 1913/14; however, Husserl observes that only categorial intentions have meaning and can give meaning to expressions and that, in contrast, single rayed acts only have sense and cannot endow words with their referential power (Hua XX-2, pp. 139–145; Melle 2002, p. 115). In his 2008 text, Vandevelde suggests that Husserl made a mistake when arriving at this conclusion. He claims that Husserl’s largely interchangeable use of sense and meaning was a ‘felicitous’ ambiguity, which allowed for Husserl’s descriptive psychology to more accurately account for our experiences of meaningful expressions (2008, pp. 45–47). I certainly disagree with this evaluation of Husserl’s evolution. In observing that only categorial acts can give meaning to expressions and by separating meaning from sense, I believe that Husserl correctly realized that our expressions and their meanings are always of a categorial or intellectual nature. I do not further address Husserl’s conclusions about single rayed acts as meaning giving or fulfilling intentions here, but have done so extensively in Byrne 2020a, b.
In contrast, the contents of imagination are termed by Husserl, “sensuous phantasms” (sinnlichen Phantasmen) (Hua XIX, p. 610/1970, p. 235).
Husserl writes, “We call the presentative or intuitive representing content [Inhalt] in and with its pertinent apprehension, the intuitive substance [Gehalt] of the act” (Hua XIX, p. 610/1970, p. 235).
According to the Husserl of 1901, no meaning intention can be executed without a corresponding intuition, or at least corresponding intuitive content. Husserl writes, “A purely signitive act … indeed if it could exist by itself at all, i.e., be a concrete experiential unity ‘on its own’. This it cannot be: we always find it clinging to some intuitive basis” (Hua XIX, p. 619/1970, p. 241). In contrast, in 1901, Husserl does assert that it is possible to execute an entirely intuitive act; namely, during internal perception.
To be noted is that, according to the Husserl of 1901, meaning giving intentions are completely unintuitive, that is, they are composed of only signitive substance. While Husserl does conclude that meaning fulfilling intentions are often intuitive, he surprisingly admits that they can also be of a signitive nature. Husserl demonstrates this point by discussing how the signitive intending of the numerical concept (53)4 can be fulfilled—whereby that concept is also clarified—by means of other signitive intentions, which uncover the sense of that concept. He writes, “We clarify the concept (53)4 by having recourse to definitory presentations” (Hua XIX, p. 601/1970, p. 229). The first step of this process would be to signitively unpack or simplify (53)4 as 53 × 53 × 53 × 53. I could then further clarify the number 53 as 5 × 5 × 5. I can continue this clarifying process via signitive intentions until “we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of which we should say: ‘This is the number (53)4 itself’” (Hua XIX, p. 601/1970, p. 229). Via the experience of these signitive presentations, which unpack (53)4 into its simplest form, we experience “an act of fulfillment not only correspondent to this final result, but to each individual step” (Hua XIX, p. 601/1970, p. 229).
According to Husserl, there is not one kind of content, which can represent all categorial forms. Instead, “there is a unique representing content for each sort of founded act” (Hua XIX, p. 699/1970, p. 298). In other words, there are different contents for the intuitive representation of the different categorial forms.
Husserl describes how we can reelly experience the overlap of matters, which he alternatively calls the “psychic bond” [das psychische Band] on Hua XIX, pp. 676–682, 696–709/1970, pp. 283–288, 296–304. For more information on how and why Husserl conceived of the overlap of matters as the contents that can intuitively represent the predicative categorial form, see Byrne 2020b; Cobb-Stevens 1990; Lohmar 1990, 2002, 2008; Sokolowski 2004.
Hua XX-2, p. 90. Cf. note six. Husserl does indeed employ the term, “empty”, in the Investigations, but he uses that term primarily to describe signitive acts as ‘empty’ of intuitive content. For further discussion of Husserl’s use of the term ‘empty’ in the Investigations, see Byrne 2017b and 2020b.
In contrast to his claims from 1901 (Cf. note twelve), Husserl concludes, in Revisions, that one can execute an entirely empty act, but not an entirely intuitive act. He now asserts that a totally empty act can be a meaning intention or a fully dark act, whereas a completely intuitive act is not possible, because, as a result of temporal extension, even internal perceptions have empty retentional components. Cf. Section 3.2 for more information on this point.
For a clear discussion of Husserl’s understanding of the interrelationships between perception and imagination, see Plotka (2020, pp. 35–40).
To be clear, Husserl’s thought concerning non-intuitive acts did not undergo a radical shift in 1913/14, as if he immediately jumped from his 1901 theory at that later date. Instead, his philosophy evolved slowly over time. The current article’s juxtaposition of Investigations and Revisions is a presentation of the results of Husserl’s decade-long endeavor to attain clarity with regards to non-intuitive experience, rather than an extended analysis of each individual step on that path of reconsideration. For the reader interested in the gradual evolution of Husserl’s thought from 1901–1913/14, I must recommend Doyon’s article from 2018 and Summa’s (2014) monograph. See also note twelve.
Melle adopts a different interpretation of Husserl’s theory. He writes, “A difference has to be made between empty representation and an obscure [dark] intuition, i.e., an intuition emptied of intuitive content. Otherwise we are faced with an infinite regress” (2002, p. 118). In this quote and in several other passages, Melle concludes that Husserl differentiates between dark and empty intentions, which, as has been shown by the above citations and through close analysis, is certainly not the case. For further discussion of why Melle is misguided in this reading, see Byrne 2020b.
Doyon also briefly touches upon this shift in Husserl’s thought writing, Husserl “now asserts that the [emptily intended] parts of objects are simply not represented at all” (2019, p. 188).
Husserl further alters his position concerning fulfillment in other significant ways in the Revisions (Hua XX-1, pp. 128–139). He states that, in addition to his reel or noetic understanding of fullness from LU, there is a real or noematic fullness. Moreover, Husserl develops a more complex and nuanced theory of fullness by modifying some of his observations from the first edition of Sect. 23 of the Sixth Investigation. He claims that fullness is to be measured according to different ranks or continuums (Rangestufe). On the one hand, as Husserl had inchoately recognized in 1901, he now claims that fullness concerns the series of extent (Umfang) or richness (Reichtum), and liveliness (Lebendigkeit). On the other hand, Husserl discovers that fullness is also ranked according to clarity (Klarheit) or distinctness (Deutlichkeit), favorability (Gunst), and determinacy (Bestimmheit). For further information on these alterations, see Melle (2002), p. 119.
Rudolf Bernet, in his article from 2004, discusses how Husserl works from his insights about possible and impossible meanings to develop a new theory of ideally possible, really possible, and actual objects (Hua XX-1, pp. 171–220). This, as Bernet claims, allows for Husserl to present a more coherent form of transcendental idealism than had been proposed in Ideas I. Bernet writes, “In successively investigating the phenomenological consciousness in which ideally possible, really possible, and actually real objects are given … Husserl is not only brought to distinguish between a broad versus a strict sense of phenomenological idealism, but will also show that the transcendental consciousness that assures us of the actuality of the world must be a consciousness that is at once both embodied and intersubjective” (2004, p. 4).
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This work was supported by The University of Macau under the Grant, “Talent Search Project”.
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Byrne, T. Smashing Husserl’s Dark Mirror: Rectifying the Inconsistent Theory of Impossible Meaning and Signitive Substance from the Logical Investigations. Axiomathes 31, 127–144 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09485-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09485-9