Abstract
Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971):
Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (1971: 57)
I argue that Conductive Arguments are not possible—the “ought” conclusion only holds if countervailing considerations are nullified.
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Notes
Johnson (2011) draws an analogy: “The dynamic in a pro/con argument seems very much like what occurs in what I have called an argument with a dialectical tier (2000a). This is an argument in which the arguer, after laying out the grounds for the conclusion (what I called the illative core), then attempts to anticipate and diffuse objections that might be raised against the argument (the dialectical tier)” (53). But no requirement for “attempts to anticipate” the counter-considerations is essential to conductive arguments. Johnson’s requirement imposes a strong burden on arguers. The topic is conductive arguments, not arguing conductively, which introduces demands of give and take (dialectic) and focuses on opinionated or controversial issues. But conductive arguments are far more general. See, for example the conductive argument in the text for the conclusion that Yale is a better buy. The goal is to learn or discover.
The New York Times 2.18.2012 reported that the World Health Organization has decided to lift the ban.
‘Conclusive’ and ‘inconclusive’ are pervasive in the text, but they are not even listed in the index.
A problem with the test is that even though Jim may assert the conclusion without qualification, it may be mutual that such predictions about delicate social relations are to be implicitly qualified. I assume that there is enough data and argument in the text to make my point even if this particular example is somewhat tricky.
These possibilities would not be in the nearest possible worlds (Lewis 1973).
This raises a difficulty: Other organisms will be able to more easily detect the strategy than if the organisms occasionally went to Area B. But this is a problem of evolutionary strategy, not germane to our topic.
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Acknowledgments
This paper was submitted for publication to the journal Argumentation, but the author passed away during the review process. The editors of the journal Argumentation thought it worthwile to make an effort to get the paper published all the same. Professor J. Anthony Blair, one of the reviewers, kindly offered to prepare the final version of the paper, taking as much as he could account of the reviews. The editors appreciate Professor Blair’s assistance in getting the paper published very much and want to express their thanks.
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Jonathan Adler: Deceased.
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Adler, J. Are Conductive Arguments Possible?. Argumentation 27, 245–257 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9286-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9286-3