Skip to main content
Log in

Contingency planning during the formation of a supply chain

  • Published:
Annals of Operations Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

With today’s growing number of geographically dispersed facilities amplifying the likelihood of supply disruptions, contingency planning has become an important strategic issue for manufacturers and distributors. This paper studies how the addition of reserve capacity in the supply chain—one of the most common strategies in contingency plans against supply disruption—can alleviate the effects of supply disruption on product and income streams and total supply chain profit. We also perform a preliminary study to find the potential implications of utilizing excess production capacity for alternative uses particularly when a firm tries selling some of its intermediate products to an external buyer who in turn could process them into finished products and compete with the firm in the same markets. We formulate a network design optimization model for supply chain contingency planning and present a decomposition procedure which exploits the natural separation between the logistics and pricing decisions in the model. Computational results are presented.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Because the quantity of goods produced by these plants is reduced, the per-unit fixed cost of goods increases. In other words, the economies of scale of these plants has diminished.

  2. It is quite a common practice for firms to use both additive and multiplicative markup approaches. For example, a firm may begin its planning process with a general percentage range of what it considers to be acceptable profit margins. Then based on market conditions, costs and other factors, the firm will eventually select a specific unit margin to add to its cost per unit.

  3. We note that our model can be adapted easily to problems with more expansive bill of materials.

  4. Note that when destination plants require additional processing in country j, then the \(a_{ij}\) s can vary with the destination country.

  5. Includes both actual freight costs, insurance on freight, and all appropriate duties, customs and other related costs.

  6. Markups on cost create profit margins for plants. These markups occur at the point of shipment (sale) from the producing country to the receiving local affiliate. Note that on a domestic, “within” country plant to plant/DC/local affiliate shipment, there is typically no markup.

  7. The model recognizes and evaluates the local taxes paid on the profits recorded by the plant selling to another plant, and on the profits generated by the DC selling to the external customer.

  8. Note we do not consider tax credit for losses in our model which is realistic and valid in some countries (see also de Matta and Miller 2015).

  9. Note that some of these arms length constraints can be relaxed, if appropriate, depending upon the tax laws of the shipping and receiving countries, and/or the policy of the multinational firm.

  10. Often a multinational firm has internal guidelines or policies regarding the range of markup percentages it will allow on transactions between its plants and local markets around the world. In many cases, local country regulations heavily influence or dictate these corporate guidelines.

  11. Simulated data are real data, but disguised to protect confidentiality. They include market demands, plant capacities and capacity consumptions, costs and market prices. Exchange rates and tax rates data were obtained from the August 2013 issue of The Financial Times newspaper.

  12. Includes direct material, labor and overhead cost.

  13. A product’s profit margin can be large for example with pharmaceutical and cosmetic products. It should be noted that profits from sales might not be allocated entirely to plants in the supply chain because plant margins are bounded by Constraints (11). In our model, the decision variable \(S_j^+ \) represents residual profits that are not allocated to the supply chain. But like the plant markups in the model these residual profits are taxed. These profits go towards recovering research and development costs and funding non-production activities which are exogenous to our model.

  14. We will provide the supply chain networks formed upon request.

  15. This could be the case when arms length pricing is enforced [see Constraints (8)].

References

  • Ahmed, S., King, A., & Parija, G. (2003). A multi-stage stochastic integer programming approach for capacity expansion under uncertainty. Journal of Global Optimization, 26, 3–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asian, S., & Nie, X. (2014). Coordination in supply chains with uncertain demand and disruption risks: Existence, analysis, and insights. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics—Systems, 44(9), 1139–1154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Azad, N., Saharidis, G., Davoudpour, H., Malekly, H., & Yektamaram, S. (2013). Strategies for protecting supply chain networks against facility and transportation disruptions: An improved benders decomposition approach. Annals of Operations Research, 210, 125–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barnes-Schuster, D., Bassok, Y., & Anupindi, R. (2002). Coordination and flexibility in supply contracts with options. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 4(3), 171–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charnes, A., & Cooper, W. (1959). Chance-constrained programming. Management Science, 6, 73–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, M., & Agrarwal, N. (1999). An analytical comparison of long and short term contract. IIE Transactions, 31(8), 783–796.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Matta, R., Lowe, T., & Zhang, D. (2014). The retailer–supplier preference to sell on consignment or wholesale. Omega, 49, 93–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Matta, R., & Miller, T. (2015). Formation of a strategic manufacturing and distribution network with transfer prices. European Journal of Operational Research, 241(2), 435–448.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geoffrion, A. (1972). Generalized benders decomposition. Journal Of Optimization Theory And Applications, 10(4), 237–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goetchalckx, M., Vidal, C., & Dogan, K. (2002). Modeling and design of global logistics systems: A review of integrated strategic and tactical models and design algorithms. European Journal of Operational Research, 143, 1–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green, M. (2004). Loss/risk management notes: Survey: executives rank fire, disruptions top threats. Best’s Reviews, September 1, Oldwick, NJ: A.M. Best Company.

  • Hammami, R., Frein, Y., & Hadj-Alouane, A. B. (2009). A strategic-tactical model for the supply chain design in the delocalization context: Mathematical formulation and a case study. International Journal of Production Economics, 122, 351–365.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Handfield, R., Blackhurst, J., Elkins, D., & Craighead, C. W. (2007). A framework for reducing the impact of disruptions to the supply chain: Observations from multiple executives. In R. B. Handfield & K. P. McCormack (Eds.), Supply chain risk management: Minimizing disruption in global sourcing (pp. 29–49). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hilton, R. (2002). Managerial accounting: Creating value in a dynamic business environment. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopp, W., & Yin, Z. (2006). Protecting supply chain networks against catastrophic failures. Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.

  • Huang, X. (2008). Capacity planning in a general supply chain with multiple contract types. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Amherst, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

  • Huchzermeier, A., & Cohen, M. (1996). Valuing operational flexibility under exchange rate risk. Operations Research, 44(1), 100–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio V12.6.0 documentation (2012).

  • Johnson, N. (1978). Modified t tests and confidence intervals for asymmetrical populations. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 73(363), 536–544.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, H., Lu, J., & Kvam, P. (2005) Ordering quantity decisions considering uncertainty in supply-chain logistics operations. Working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA

  • Li, X., Li, Y., & Cai, X. (2013). Double marginalization in the supply chain with uncertain supply and coordination contract design. European Journal of Operational Research, 226(2), 228–236.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, X., Li, Y., & Cai, X. (2012). A note on the random yield from the perspective of the supply chain. Omega: The International Journal of Management Science, 40, 601–610.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, X. (2015) Optimal procurement strategies from suppliers with random yield and all-or-nothing. doi:10.1007/s10479-015-1923-4.

  • Malone, R. (2006). Growing supply chain risks by Robert Malone at http://www.forbes.com/2006/09/25/accenture-supply-chain-risks-biz_logistics_cx_rm_0925risks.html

  • Moorthy, K. S. (1988). Strategic decentralization in channels. Marketing Science, 7, 335–355.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, T. (2002). Hierarchical operations and supply chain management. London: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, T., & de Matta, R. (2008). A global supply chain profit maximization and transfer pricing model. Journal of Business Logistics, 29, 175–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raimondos-Moller, P., & Scharf, K. (2002). Transfer pricing rules and competing governments. Oxford Economic Papers. Oxford, 54(2), 230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salehi, N., Torabi, S., & Sahebjamnia, N. (2015). Retail supply chain network design under operational and disruption risks. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 75, 95–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shunko, M., & Gavirneni, S. (2007). Role of transfer prices in global supply chains with random demands. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 3(1), 99–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, L., Scaparra, M., Daskin, M., & Church, R. (2006). Planning for disruptions in supply chain networks. Tutorials in Operations Research, INFORMS, 234–256.

  • Snyder, L., & Shen, M. (2006). Disruptions in multi-echelon supply chains: A simulation study. Working paper, Lehigh University.

  • Smith, M. (2002). Ex ante and Ex Post discretion over arm’s length transfer prices. The Accounting Review, 77, 161–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swinney, R., & Netessine, S. (2009). Long-term contracts under the threat of supplier default. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 11(1), 109–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tomlin, B. (2006). On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks. Management Science, 52(5), 639–657.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Mieghem, J. (2003). Capacity management, investment, and hedging: Review and recent developments. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 5(4), 269–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walpole, R., & Myers, R. (1972). Probability and statistics for engineers and scientists. New York: The Macmillan Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, H. (1969). Principles of operations research. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang, F., Roundy, R., & Cakanyildirim, M. (2004). Optimal capacity expansion for multi-product, multi-machine manufacturing systems with stochastic demand. IIE Transactions, 36(1), 23–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions which significantly improved the manuscript. This research has been supported by the Larry and Lori Wright Research Fellowship.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Renato de Matta.

Appendices

Appendix 1

We now present our solution procedure. Consider the formulation of Problem (SP).

Problem (SP):

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{l} \displaystyle Z(X)=\mathop {{\textit{Maximize}}}\limits _{{\textit{AOP}},U,{\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},S} \sum \limits _{j=1}^n {e_j ({\textit{AOP}}_j -U_j } ) \\ \displaystyle {\textit{subject to}}:\; (2), (5){-}(12),(14) \hbox { and } (15). \\ \end{array} \end{aligned}$$

Next we develop an alternative formulation that is equivalent to Problem (SP) and call it (SP’). Problem (SP’) has the same optimal solution and optimal value as Problem (SP), but it has the structure we need to generate cuts for the restricted master problem that are linear in variable X as will be shown later. To make this possible, we introduce new variables. In Constraints (5) and (6), denote \(W_{ijk}\) to be the cost allocation of each unit produced by activity i in country j which is shipped to country k. Also, let \(V_{p(i)\ell j}\) represent the cost of outbound shipment of products produced by activity p(i) in country \(\ell \) bound for country j. We construct Problem (SP’) from Problem (SP) by replacing Constraints (5) with equivalent Constraints (5-1) and (5-2) as shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} {\textit{COST}}_{1jk} =W_{1jk} +c_{1j} X_{1jk}, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \end{aligned}$$
(5-1)
$$\begin{aligned} W_{1jk} =\frac{g_{1j} X_{1jk}}{\sum \nolimits _{\ell =1}^n {X_{1j\ell }} }, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \forall j=1,\ldots ,n \end{aligned}$$
(5-2)

We also replace Constraints (6) with equivalent Constraints (6-1), (6-2) and (6-3).

$$\begin{aligned} {\textit{COST}}_{ijk} =&W_{ijk} +c_{ij} X_{ijk}^ ,\quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=2,\ldots m, \end{aligned}$$
(6-1)
$$\begin{aligned} W_{ijk} =&\frac{X_{ijk}}{\sum \nolimits _{s=1}^n {X_{p(i)sj}} }\sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {({\textit{COST}}_{p(i)\ell j} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{p(i)\ell j} +V_{p(i)\ell j} +g_{ij} )} , \\ \forall k=&1,\ldots ,n, \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=2,\ldots m. \end{aligned}$$
(6-2)
$$\begin{aligned} V_{p(i)\ell j}=&r_{p(i)\ell j} X_{p(i)\ell j} , \quad \forall \ell =1,\ldots ,n, \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \forall i=2,\ldots m. \end{aligned}$$
(6-3)

Notice that when the variable X is fixed, Constraints (5-1) thru (6-3) above are linear in both variables COST, MARKUP, W, and V. In the same token, when the variables COST, MARKUP, W, and V are fixed, Constraints (5-1) thru (6-3) are linear in the variable X. We need this modeling artifice in order to generate linear cuts for the restricted master problem as will be shown later. Next we eliminate AOP by substituting (10) in the Objective Function (1) and Constraints (2). We also break up Constraints (11) into two constraints. Problem (SP’) is shown next. For ease of reference, we display the dual variables (represented by subscripted Greek letters) on the right side of each constraint of Problem (SP’).

Problem (SP’):

Dual Variables

\(Z(X)=\mathop {{\textit{Maximize}}}\limits _{{\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V} \sum \limits _{j=1}^n {e_j \left( \sum \limits _{i=1}^m {\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} } } +S_j^+ - S_j^- -U_j \right) }\)

  

s.t.

  

\({\textit{tax}}_j \left[ \sum \limits _{i=1}^m {\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} +(S_j^+ - S_j^- )}\right] -U_j \le 0,\quad \forall j=1\ldots n\)

(2)

\(\alpha _j\)

\({\textit{COST}}_{1jk} =W_{1jk} +c_{1j} X_{1jk}\quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \forall j=1,\ldots ,n,\)

(5-1)

\(\beta _{1jk}\)

\(W_{1jk} =\frac{g_{1j} X_{1jk}}{\sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {X_{1j\ell }} },\qquad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n,\quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n\)

(5-2)

\(\pi _{1jk}\)

\({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} =W_{ijk} +c_{ij} X_{ijk} \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n,\quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n,\quad \forall i=2,\ldots m,\)

(6-1)

\(\beta _{ijk}\)

\(W_{ijk} =\frac{X_{ijk}}{\sum \limits _{s=1}^n {X_{p(i)sj}} }\sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {({\textit{COST}}_{p(i)\ell j} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{p(i)\ell j} +V_{p(i)\ell j} +g_{ij} )} ,\quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n,\quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n,\quad \forall i=2,\ldots m,\)

(6-2)

\(\pi _{ijk}\)

\(V_{p(i)\ell j} =r_{p(i)\ell j} X_{p(i)\ell j} , \quad \forall \ell =1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=2,\ldots m.\)

(6-3)

\(\varsigma _{i\ell j}\)

\(\sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {({\textit{COST}}_{m\ell k} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{m\ell j} +r_{m\ell j} X_{m\ell j} )} +(S_j^+ - S_j^- )=\rho _j d_j , \quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n,\)

(7)

\(\xi _j\)

\(\frac{{\textit{COST}}_{ijk} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} }{X_{ijk}} = \frac{ {\textit{COST}}_{ij\ell } +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ij\ell } }{X_{ij\ell }}, \quad \forall j=1,\ldots n, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall \ell =1,\ldots ,n,\)

  

\(k\ne \ell ,\quad \forall i=1,\ldots m\)

(8)

\(\varphi _{ijk\ell }\)

\(\frac{{\textit{COST}}_{p(i)\ell j} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{p(i)\ell j} }{X_{p(i)\ell j}} \le \frac{\sum \nolimits _{k=1}^n {({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} )} }{\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {X_{ijk}} } , \quad \forall \ell =1,\ldots n, \quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=2,\ldots ,m\)

(9)

\(\psi _{i\ell j}\)

\({\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} \hbox {-rmax}_{ij} {\textit{COST}}_{ijk} \le 0, \quad \forall j=1,\ldots n, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=1,\ldots m,\)

(11-1)

\(\tau _{ijk}\)

\({\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} \hbox {-rmin}_{ij} {\textit{COST}}_{ijk} \ge 0, \quad \forall j=1,\ldots n, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=1,\ldots m,\)

(11-2)

\(\phi _{ijk}\)

\({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} \le MX_{ijk}^ , \quad \forall j=1,\ldots n, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=1,\ldots m,\)

(12)

\(\gamma _{ijk}\)

\(U_j ,S_j^+ , S_j^- \ge 0, \quad \forall j=1, 2,\ldots ,n,\)

(14)

 

\({\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} , {\textit{COST}}_{ijk} ,W_{ijk} ,V_{ijk} \ge 0, \quad \forall k=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall j=1,\ldots ,n, \quad \forall i=1,\ldots m.\)

(15)

 

We note that for any X,  Problem (SP’) is a concave program with a finite optimal solution. This implies that for any given X, an optimal solution to the dual of Problem (SP’) exists. Next we show how we employ the optimal primal and dual solutions of Problem (SP’) to construct a cut. Let f(COSTMARKUPUSWV) represent the objective function of Problem (SP’) and \(G(COST,MARKUP,U,S,W,V)\ge 0\) the constraint set of problem (SP’). Denote the LP dual of problem (SP’) by Problem (DSP’). Also let the set of dual variables \(\{\alpha ,\beta ,\pi ,\varsigma ,\xi ,\psi ,\tau ,\phi ,\varphi ,\gamma \}\)be represented by \(\mu \) for any given X. The dual problem can be formulated as:

Problem (DSP’):

$$\begin{aligned} Z(X)=\mathop {\hbox {Minimize}}\limits _{\mu \ge 0} L(X,\mu ) \end{aligned}$$

where \(L(X,\mu )=\mathop {\hbox {Maximize}}\limits _{{\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V\ge 0} f({\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V)+ \mu G({\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V)\). Expanding \(L(X,\mu )\) yields:

$$\begin{aligned}&L(X,\mu )\\&\quad =\mathop {\hbox {Maximize}}\limits _{{\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V\ge 0} \left\{ \sum \limits _{j=1}^n e_j \left( \sum \limits _{i=1}^m {\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} } } -\sum \limits _{i=1}^m {g_{ij} V_{ij}} +(S_j^+ - S_j^- )-U_j \right) \right. \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\alpha _j \left( tax_j \left[ \sum \limits _{i=1}^m {\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} } } +(S_j^+ -S_j^- )\right] -U_j\right) } \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\beta _{1jk} ({\textit{COST}}_{1jk} -W_{1jk} -c_{1j} X_{1jk} )} }\\&\qquad + \sum \limits _{k=1}^n {\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\pi _{1jk} \left( W_{1jk} \sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {X_{1j\ell } } -g_{1j} X_{1jk} \right) } } \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\sum \limits _{i=2}^m {\beta _{ijk} ({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} -W_{ijk} -c_{ij} X_{ijk} )} } } \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{k=1}^n \sum \limits _{j=1}^n \sum \limits _{i=2}^m \pi _{ijk} \left( W_{ijk} \sum \limits _{s=1}^n {X_{p(i)sj}} -X_{ijk} \sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n \left( COST_{p(i)\ell j}\right. \right. \\&\qquad +\left. \left. {\textit{MARKUP}}_{p(i)\ell j} +V_{p(i)\ell j} +g_{ij} \right) \right) \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{i=2}^m {\sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\varsigma _{p(i)\ell j} (V_{p(i)\ell j} -r_{p(i)\ell j} } } } X_{p(i)\ell j} )\\ \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned}&\qquad +\sum \limits _{j=1}^n { \xi _j \left[ \sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {({\textit{COST}}_{m\ell k} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{m\ell j} +r_{m\ell j} X_{m\ell j} )} +(S_j^+ - S_j^- )-\rho _j d_j \right] } \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{i=1}^m \sum \limits _{j=1}^n \sum \limits _{k=1}^n \sum \limits _{ \ell =1, \ell \ne k}^n \phi _{ijk\ell } (({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} )X_{ij\ell }\\&\qquad - ({\textit{COST}}_{ij\ell } +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ij\ell } )X_{ijk} ) \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{i=2}^m \sum \limits _{j=1}^n \sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n \psi _{i\ell j} \left[ \sum \limits _{k=1}^n X_{ijk} ({\textit{COST}}_{p(i)\ell j} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{p(i)\ell j} )\right. \\&\qquad -\left. (X_{p(i)\ell j} \sum \limits _{k=1}^n ({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} + {\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk}) \right] \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{i=1}^m \sum \limits _{j=1}^n \sum \limits _{k=1}^n \tau _{ijk} ({\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} -\hbox {rmax}_{ij} {\textit{COST}}_{ijk}) \\&\qquad +\sum \limits _{i=1}^m {\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {\varphi _{ijk} (\hbox {rmin}_{ij} {\textit{COST}}_{ijk} -{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} )} } }\\&\qquad +\left. \sum \limits _{i=1}^m {\sum \limits _{j=1}^n {\sum \limits _{k=1}^n {\gamma _{ijk} ({\textit{COST}}_{ijk} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{ijk} -MX_{ijk} )} } } \right\} \\ \end{aligned}$$

Given X, let the primal optimal solution of Problem (SP’) be represented by (COST*, MARKUP*, U*, S*, W*, V*) and the optimal solution of Problem (DSP’) by \(\mu ^{*}=\{\alpha ^{*}, \beta ^{*},\pi ^{*},\varsigma ^{*},\xi ^{*},\phi ^{*}, \psi ^{*},\tau ^{*},\varphi ^{*},\gamma ^{*}\}\). These optimal solutions can be obtained easily by solving problem (SP’) directly using CPLEX (IBM ILOG CPLEX 2012). We substitute (COST*, MARKUP*, U*, S*, W*,V*) and \(\mu ^{*}\) in\(L(X,\mu )\). This yields a linear equation in variable X. We note that with Geoffrion’s generalized Benders decomposition (Geoffrion 1972), \(f({\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V)\) and \(G(X,{\textit{COST}},{\textit{MARKUP}},U,S,W,V)\) need not be linearly separable in X and (\({\textit{COST}}, {\textit{MARKUP}}, U, S, W,V\)). Furthermore, the dual solution in the generalized Benders decomposition is dependent on the values of X. Next we discuss the master problem.

Define the set \(A=\{X \)such that X satisfies constraints (3), (4), and (13)}. In other words set A represents the feasible set of product flows on our supply chain network. We can reformulate our original Problem (P) by introducing in the objective function a variable \(\theta \) such that \(\theta \le L(X,\mu )\) for every \(X\in A\)(and \(X's\) associated \(\mu ^{*})\). The new model is called the master problem. Because the number of \(X's\) in set A can be enormous, we shall solve a “restricted” master problem instead. Define \(w = {\vert }\hbox {B}{\vert }\) where B \(\subset A\). Let \(L_t (X,\mu )\) be the linear cut generated at iteration t. The restricted master problem is formulated as a network flow problem with linear side constraints. It is given by:

Problem (\(R_w \)):

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{l} \mathop {{\textit{Maximize}}}\limits _{\theta \ge 0} \theta \\ {\textit{subject to}}:\; (3)-(4),(13) \hbox { and } \\ \theta _ \le L_t (X,\mu ), \quad \forall t=1,\ldots ,w. \\ \end{array} \end{aligned}$$

The restricted master problem’s objective function value is an upper bound (UB) on the optimal value of Problem (P), whereas the sub-problem’s optimal value is a lower bound (LB) on the optimal value of Problem (P).

Appendix 2

This section presents the model formulations of the firm’s and external buyer’s pricing decisions in the Stakelberg game. For tractability, we assume linear demand. We start first with the model formulation of the external buyer’s problem. We determine the external buyer’s optimal price given the firm’s wholesale and market prices. Then we present the firm’s problem which is Problem (P) with modifications in the technological constraints.

1.1 A.1 The external Buyer’s problem

Let w represent the wholesale price per unit that the firm charges the external buyer for the intermediate product. This is the landed cost of the intermediate product delivered from echelon B. Define \(\hat{{c}}\) to be the unit cost incurred by the external buyer to process the intermediate product, which it buys from the firm, into a finished product. Let \(d_{ej} (d_{\textit{fj}} )\) be the external buyer’s (firm’s) market demand in country j. Also, let \(p_{ej}\; (p_{\textit{fj}})\) be the external buyer’s (firm’s) price in market j. Finally, define \(\pi _e (w,p_f )\) to be the external buyer’s profit given the firm’s wholesale and market prices. Assume the parameters \(a_2 , b, \hbox {and} \gamma \) of the linear demand function to be the same for all countries. Also, assume that the firm charges its affiliates and the external buyer the same wholesale price for the intermediate product.Footnote 15 The external buyer’s problem is as follows.

Problem (EB):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathop {{\textit{Max}}}\limits _{p_{ej} ,\quad \forall j} \pi _e (w,p_f )= & {} \sum \limits _{j=1}^n {(p_{ej} -(w+\hat{{c}}))d_{ej} } \nonumber \\= & {} \sum \limits _{j=1}^n {(p_{ej} -(w+\hat{{c}}))(d_j -d_{\textit{fj}} (p_{ej} ,p_{\textit{fj}} ))}\nonumber \\= & {} \sum \limits _{j=1}^n {(p_{ej} -(w+\hat{{c}}))(d_j -a_2 d_j +bp_{\textit{fj}} -\gamma p_{ej} )} \end{aligned}$$
(22)

Next we find the external buyer’s optimal price as follows. Taking the first partial derivative of \(\pi _e \) with respect to \(p_e \) yields

\(\frac{\partial \pi _e }{\partial p_{ej} }=(d_j -a_2 d_j +bp_{\textit{fj}} -\gamma p_{ej} )-\gamma (p_{ej} -(w+\hat{{c}}))\quad .\) Since \(\frac{\partial ^{2}\pi _e }{\partial p_{ej} ^{2}}=-2\gamma <0\), setting \(\frac{\partial \pi _e }{\partial p_{ej} }=0\) yields the external buyer’s optimal price

$$\begin{aligned} p_{ej}^*=\frac{1}{2}\left[ {\frac{(1-a_2 )d_j +bp_{\textit{fj}} }{\gamma }+(w+\hat{{c}})} \right] \end{aligned}$$
(23)

For a given b,  as \(\gamma \) increases, \((b- \gamma )\) decreases (which implies a strong competition) and this causes \(p_{ej}^*\) to decrease in turn. Also, \(p_{ej}^*\) is increasing in \(p_{\textit{fj}} \) and \((w+\hat{{c}})\).

1.2 A.2 The firm’s problem

The firm’s problem is to find the optimal wholesale price \(w* \)and the market price \(p_{\textit{fj}}^*\). It is basically Problem (P) with some modifications. Let \(\hat{{\delta }} , 0<\hat{{\delta }}<1\), be the firm’s percentage gross profit (after deducting distribution and sales expenses). It follows \(\rho _j =\hat{{\delta }}p_{\textit{fj}} , \quad \forall j.\) The firm’s problem is given below.

Problem (P’):

$$\begin{aligned} {{\textit{Maximize}}} \; Z= \sum \limits _{j=1}^n {e_j (AOP_j -U_j } ) \end{aligned}$$
(1)

subject to: (2)–(6), (8)–(16), and

$$\begin{aligned}&\sum \limits _{\ell =2}^n {({\textit{COST}}_{m\ell j} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{m\ell j} +r_{m\ell j} X_{m\ell j} )} +\left( S_j^+ -S_j^- \right) \\&\quad =\rho _j d_{\textit{fj}} (p_{\textit{fj}} ,p_{ej}^*), \forall j=1,\ldots ,n,\,\, \,\, p_{\textit{fj}} \ge 0,\quad \forall j. \end{aligned}$$
(7')

We note that the index \(\ell \) in (7’) starts at 2 since the plant in country 1 has been designated as the external buyer. Also note that \(p_{\textit{fj}} \) is a decision variable in Problem (P’).

The right hand side of (7’) can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _j d_{\textit{fj}} (p_{\textit{fj}} ,p_e^*)= & {} \delta p_{\textit{fj}} (a_2 d_j -bp_{\textit{fj}} +\gamma p_{ej}^*)\nonumber \\= & {} \frac{\delta }{2}\left[ {p_{\textit{fj}} d_j \left( {a_2 +1+\frac{\gamma (w+\hat{{c}})}{d_j }} \right) -bp_{\textit{fj}}^2 } \right] \end{aligned}$$
(24)

Notice that (24) is quadratic in \(p_{\textit{fj}}\). To obtain a solution to Problem (P’), we can approximate (24) using a piecewise linear function (see Wagner 1969). Finally, the optimal wholesale price is the landed cost of the intermediate product which is given by

$$\begin{aligned} w^*= \quad \sum \limits _{\ell =1}^n {\left( {\frac{X_{p(2)\ell 1} }{\sum \limits _{s=1}^n {X_{p(2)s1} } }} \right) \left( {\frac{{\textit{COST}}_{p(2)\ell 1} +{\textit{MARKUP}}_{p(2)\ell 1} }{X_{p(2)\ell 1} }+r_{p(2)\ell 1} } \right) } , \end{aligned}$$
(25)

where the subscript p(2) represents echelon B and the subscripts \(\ell \) and s represent source countries of the intermediate product.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

de Matta, R. Contingency planning during the formation of a supply chain. Ann Oper Res 257, 45–75 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-2085-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-2085-0

Keywords

Navigation