Abstract
The presence of credit constraints can shape the entry, growth, and size distribution of firms. In this paper, I consider the optimal contract between banks and entrepreneurs in an economy in which limitations in the punishments for default induce limitations in the credit available to entrepreneurs. I derive a very simple characterization of the optimal contract at the time of inception of firms and show how this optimal contract shapes the evolution of the size distribution of firms and the aggregate levels of entrepreneurial activity and output.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Albuquerque R., Hopenhayn H.A.: Optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics. Rev Econ Stud 71, 285–315 (2004)
Alvarez F., Jermann U.: Efficiency, equilibrium, and asset pricing with risk of default. Econometrica 68, 775–797 (2000)
Atkeson A., Kehoe P.J.: Modeling and measuring organization capital. J Polit Econ 113, 1026–1053 (2005)
Banerjee A.V., Newman A.F.: Risk-bearing and the theory of income distribution. Rev Econ Stud 58, 211–235 (1991)
Buera, F.: Persistency of Poverty, Financial Frictions, and Entrepreneurship, Working Paper, Northwestern University
Cabral L., Mata J.: On the evolution of the firm size distribution: facts and theory. Am Econ Rev 93, 1075–1090 (2003)
Cagetti M., De Nardi M.: Entrepreneurship, frictions, and wealth. J Polit Econ 114, 835–870 (2006)
Cagetti M., De Nardi M.: Estate taxation, entrepreneurship, and wealth. Am Econ Rev 99, 85–111 (2009)
Cooley T., Quadrini V.: Financial markets and firm dynamics. Am Econ Rev 91, 1286–1310 (2001)
Cooley T., Marimon R., Quadrini V.: Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability. J Polit Econ 112, 817–847 (2004)
Guner N., Ventura G., Yi X.: Macroeconomic implications of size-dependent policies. Rev Econ Dyn 11, 721–744 (2008)
Hart O., Moore J.: A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital. Quart J Econ 109, 841–879 (1994)
Holmes T.J., Schmitz J.A. Jr: A theory of entrepreneurship and its application to the study of business transfers. J Polit Econ 98, 265–294 (1990)
Kehoe T., Levine D.: Debt-constrained asset markets. Rev Econ Stud 60, 865–888 (1993)
Kocherlakota N.: Implications of efficient risk sharing without commitment. Rev Econ Stud 63, 595–609 (1996)
Lazear E.P.: Entrepreneurship. J Labor Econ 23, 649–680 (2005)
Ljungqvist L., Sargent T.: Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (2004)
Lucas R.E. Jr: On the size distribution of business firms. Bell J Econ 9, 508–523 (1978)
Monge-Naranjo, A.: Financial Markets, Creation and Liquidation of Firms and Aggregate Dynamics, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago (2009)
Quintin E.: Limited enforcement and the organization of production. J Macroecon 30, 1222–1245 (2008)
Restuccia D., Rogerson R.: Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with heterogeneous establishments. Rev Econ Dyn 11, 707–720 (2008)
Townsend R.: Optimal multiperiod contracts and the gains from enduring relationships under private information. J Polit Econ 90, 1166–86 (1982)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
The paper benefited from useful comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee and from seminar participants at Duke University, Northwestern University, and University of Western Ontario.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Monge-Naranjo, A. Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement. Ann Finance 5, 465–494 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-009-0122-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-009-0122-1