Abstract
The aim of this paper is to construct a critical evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the physicalistic theory concerning mental phenomena and consciousness. Physicalism can, better than other theories, explain mental phenomena, such as intentionality and reasonability of human beings and other biological organisms. Modern neuroscience corroborates the conviction that the brain is a physical mind capable of giving meaning to, evaluating and further cognitively and behaviorally transforming complex aspects of the world. On the other hand, the emergence of consciousness from brain states seems to be a paradoxical, intransparent, physical coincidence hardly explained by the mental function of the brain at the physical level. Moreover, the intentionality and reasonability of psychic phenomena per se cannot be explained as a repercussion of the same attributes characterizing the brain function. In conclusion, the old debate between physicalism and other philosophical theories remains open. It can be expected that the progress of sciences will inspire novel approaches to the problem of the relations between matter, mind and consciousness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Alexander S (1920) Space, time and deity. Macmillan, London
Baars BJ (1997) In the theatre of consciousness: global workspace theory, a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. JCS 4(4):292–309
Baddeley A (1996) The fractionation of working memory. PNAS 93:13468–13472
Bechtel W (1988) Philosophy of mind: an overview for cognitive science. Hillsdale, New Jersey
Block N (2006) What is functionalism? In: Block N (ed) Readings in philosophy of psychology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp. 171–184 (reprinted edition)
Boss BJ (1996) Pragmatics: right brain communication. Axone 17(4):81–85
Chalmers D (1996) The conscious mind. Oxford University Press, New York
Chow TW (2000) Personality in frontal lobe disorders. Curr Psychiatry Rep 2(5):446–451
Churchland P (1988) Matter and consciousness—revised edition: a contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge
Cotman CW, Monaghan DT, Ganong AHA (1988) Excitatory amino acid neurotransmission. NMDA receptors and Hebb-type synaptic plasticity. Annu Rev Neurosci 11:61–80
Crick F, Koch C (1990) Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Semin Neurosci 2:263–275
Cummings J, Mega M (2003) Neuropsychiatry and behavioral neuroscience. Oxford University Press, New York
Damasio H, Tranel D, Grabowski T, Adolphs R, Damasio A (2004) Neural systems behind word and concept retrieval. Cognition 92(1–2):179–229
Davidson D (2001) Essays on actions and events: philosophical essays of Donald Davidson, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, New York
Dennett DC (1988) Quining qualia. In: Marcel AJ, Bisiach E (eds) Consciousness in contemporary Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 42–77
Edelman G, Tononi G (2000) A universe of consciousness. How Matter Becomes Imagination. Basic Books, New York
Edelman G (2004) Wider than the sky. The phenomenal gift of consciousness. Yale University Press, New Haven
Fodor J (1995) The Elm and the expert: mentalise and its semantics. MIT Press, Cambridge
Funahashi S, Bruce CJ, Goldman-Rakic PS (1989) Mnemonic coding of visual space in the monkey’s dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. J Neurophysiol 61:331–349
Hartshorne C (1950) Panpsychism. In: Ferm V (eds) A history of philosophical systems. Philosophical Library, New York, pp 422–453
Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia. Philos Q 32:127–136
Kandel E, Schwartz J, Jessel T (2000) Principles or neural science. Mc Graw Hill, New York
Kim J (1996) Philosophy of mind. Westview Press, Oxford
Le Doux J (1999) The emotional brain. The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. Phoenix, London
Leutgeb S, Leutgeb JW, Moser MB, Moser EI (2005) Place cells, spatial maps and the population code for memory. Curr Opin Neurobiol 15(6):738–746
McCandliss BD, Noble KG (2003) The development of reading impairment: a cognitive neuroscience model. Ment Retard Dev Disabil Res Rev 9(3):136–204
Nagel T (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philos Rev 83:435–450
Penrose R, Hameroff S (1995) What gaps? JCS 2:99–112
Popper K, Eccles J (1984) The self and its brain; an argument for interactionism. Routledge, London
Putman H (1967) The nature of mental states. In: Putman H (eds) Mind language and reality: philosophical papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 429–440
Quiroga RQ, Reddy L, Kreiman G, Koch C, Fried M (2005) Invariant visual representation by single neurons in the human brain. Nature 435(7045):1102–1107
Rizzolatti G, Craighero L (2004) The mirror-neuron system. Annu Rev Neurosci 27:169–192
Sacks O (1996) The man who mistook his wife for a hat and other clinical tales. Touchstone, New York
Sejnowski J, Rosenberg C (1987) Parallel networks that learn to pronounce English text. Complex Syst 1:145–168
Smart JJC (1959) Sensations and brain processes. Philos Rev 68:141–156
Turing A (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59:433–460
Tversky A, Kahneman D (1982) Judgments under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Livaditis, M., Tsatalmpasidou, E. A critical review of the physicalistic approaches of the mind and consciousness. Cogn Process 8, 1–9 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-007-0161-3
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-007-0161-3