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On the edge of the EU: Turkey’s choice between ‘privileged partnership’ and non-accession

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Abstract

Turkey’s negotiations on accession to the EU began on October 3, 2005. After more than 10 years, the future course of negotiations becomes as ambivalent and ambiguous as ever. While the fundamental debate on Turkey’s accession to the EU was about whether Turkey should be a full-member state or a ‘privileged partner’, the axis of Turkey’s integration to the EU began shifting to one of Turkey’s choice between ‘privileged partnership’ and non-accession. The main reason for making such an assumption is that there is no reliable evidence in the last decade to predict whether or not Turkey can, aims to or will ever become a full member of the EU. In addition to this, key actors of the EU such as France and Germany openly declared their opposition to Turkey’s accession and several EU member states including France and Austria announced their plans for a referendum on Turkey’s full membership. Therefore, it would be feasible to explore the possibilities of alternative choices to unification in advance.

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Notes

  1. The term ‘absorption capacity’ officially appeared in the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Summit in 1993 as: ‘The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.’ European Council (1993), European Council (2006), European Commission (2005).

  2. Islamophobia has been defined by the Runnymede Trust as ‘an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination’. Islamophobia consists of ‘closed views’ of Islam, which do not constitute legitimate criticism, and characterise Islam as separatist, monolithic, inferior and a manipulative aggressive enemy that rejects any criticisms made by the West. Runnymede Trust (1997).

  3. In an interview, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, said, ‘We regard the Customs Union as an exceptionally important step on the way to Turkey’s full membership to the union.’ Pipes and Clawson (1995).

  4. ‘These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.’ (Emphasis added). European Council (2005).

  5. The dilemma with the ‘identity’ question in the EU is whether it will be comprehended as a primary tool of ‘construction’ of a European Community upon the identity of member states through a constructivist-supranational integration or conceived as the continuation of ‘partnership’ of different political identities of member states through a rationalist-intergovernmental co-operation. Weiler (1981), Haas ( 1968), Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2004).

  6. Salt (2015a). On pages 127 and 129, Salt explains that the ‘new Turkey’ would be reached by ‘education, indoctrination, social pressure and fertility’, which ‘are the means by which Erdogan’s “pious generations” […] On one day he says every woman should have three children, and on another that they should have five, exhorting women to play their part in the creation of the “new Turkey” […] If critical mass could be achieved, the desecularization of the state through the democratic choice of an indoctrinated and re-engineered people would be the logical next step’.

  7. The following five scenarios are (1) Carrying On—The EU27 focuses on delivering its positive reform agenda in the spirit of the Commission’s New Start for Europe from 2014 and of the Bratislava Declaration agreed by all 27 Member States in 2016; (2) Nothing but the Single Market—The EU27 is gradually re-centred on the single market as the 27 Member States are not able to find common ground on an increasing number of policy areas; (3) Those Who Want More Do More—The EU27 proceeds as today but allows willing Member States to do more together in specific areas such as defence, internal security or social matters. One or several ‘coalitions of the willing’ emerge; (4) Doing Less More Efficiently—The EU27 focuses on delivering more and faster in selected policy areas, while doing less where it is perceived not to have an added value. Attention and limited resources are focused on selected policy areas; (5) Doing Much More Together—Member States decide to share more power, resources and decision-making across the board. Decisions are agreed faster at European level and rapidly enforced. European Commission - Press release (2017).

  8. For more analyses on these proposals see Hürsoy (2002).

  9. ‘As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of accession of Turkey to the Community’ (Article 28). Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey (Ankara: September 12, 1963), Official Journal 16(C113), (December 24, 1973).

  10. According to [Article 310 (ex Article 238) of the EC Treaty], ‘The Community may conclude with one or more States or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.’ European Union (2002.).

  11. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) asserts ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ Available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201,155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf>(accessed: 09.05.2015)

  12. Article 8 [7a] [‘The Union and its neighbours’, Article I-57 (ex Article 300 TEC)] ‘1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on co-operation. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.’ Available at <http://www.eurotreaties.com/lisbontext.pdf> (accessed: 12.05.2015).

  13. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was found in 2004 and incorporates Mediterranean countries, focuses on EU’s bilateral relations with each Euro-Mediterranean partner, while the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its successor UfM provides multilateral forums where all the countries can meet together. Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995.).

  14. The agreement on the EEA, which entered into force on January 1, 1994, brings together the EU states and, except Switzerland, the three EEA EFTA states—Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway—in a single market. This agreement enables the four freedoms—goods, services, capital and persons to move freely—in the EEA.

  15. Recep T. Erdoğan once said in 1994, ‘Thank God almighty I am a servant of sharia,’ and early in the life of his government in 2004, he wanted to introduce a specifically Islamic law (zina) criminalising adultery. He also reportedly once said that democracy was like a tram: ‘You ride it until you reach your destination, then you get off.’ Quoted in Serdar (2008).

  16. (Çağaptay 2011). Çağaptay, S., The Rise of Turkey, p.130.

  17. Salt observed: ‘Erdogan is aggressive and authoritarian; increasingly, he is the state. When he speaks, others follow without question. “Enemies” are being flushed out of the system; the judiciary has been brought under tight government control; intelligence and police powers have been extended; and the media is being harassed. Yet, for his loyal supporters, the leader can do no wrong, no matter how serious the evidence of malfeasance within the government and disruption of the constitutional system.’ Salt (2015c).

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Correspondence to Siret Hürsoy.

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Hürsoy, S. On the edge of the EU: Turkey’s choice between ‘privileged partnership’ and non-accession. Asia Eur J 15, 319–339 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0468-3

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