Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of internal factors, such as governance institutions and financial development, versus external, such as capital flows uncertainty, on the excess savings of large emerging market economies (EMEs), identified as a major factor behind their trade surpluses. Using instrumental variables regression to control for endogeneity from institutions, we study eight major EMEs over 1995–2018 as well as a larger panel including both AEs and EMEs over 2001–2018 for robustness. Baseline estimates show that, along with financial development, democratic accountability and judiciary influence CA surpluses in both EMEs and AEs. Anti-corruption measures and government stability are influential specifically in AEs and EMEs respectively. For both EMEs and AEs, surpluses decrease with greater dependence on primary commodity exports supporting the “resource curse” thesis. That EME surpluses move negatively with better institutions and positively with capital flows uncertainty supports the precautionary motive. Sources of EME surpluses changed substantially from the pre- to the post-GFC years. During 2001–2008, higher growth, initial wealth, uncertainty in net capital flows increased surpluses. After 2008, reduced growth, lower CB intervention and better institutions rebalanced surpluses, particularly for Asia–Pacific nations.
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Notes
AEs have some exceptions. For example, Germany has persistently incurred surpluses on its current account. Such imbalances are more linked to AE country-specific factors like low investment (Cheung et al., 2020).
Basic national income accounting shows that the net savings of a nation determines its CAB e.g. Spvt + Spub − I = X − M.
National Savings = Spermanent + Suncertain.
The role of foreign spillovers in EME imbalances has been already studied, for example, Djigbenou-Kre and Hail (2015) showed a significant linkage between AE monetary aggregates and imbalances in EMEs through global liquidity channel.
Cooper (2007), however, argues that although the US savings rate was low compared to developing economies, it is understated. Allowance should be made for educational expenditure, expenditure on research and development or training and product branding that would create future returns.
This sample is a follow-up of earlier papers e.g., Banerjee and Goyal (2021, 2022) where considerable presence of mercantilist efforts as well as monetary spillovers is found in the same sample of emerging markets. Recently, Aizenman et al. (2021) also study a similar sample of eight major emerging markets (EMs)—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey because of their significant participation in global finance. These eight EMEs are the largest in terms of both absolute and per capita GDPs and account for a major share of inflows to developing economies. As per World Bank data, the total net portfolio inflows to these nations stood at $52 billion in 2020 and exceeded that of the entire “low and middle income” group ($34 billion) by a factor of 1.5.
The start year is restricted to 1995 due to non-availability of several variables for China and Russia.
We effectively use 19 AEs and EMEs since data on Canada was not completely available.
Capital flows data which is origin-destination based, is collected taking US as origin. So the analysis is only for EMEs.
Rey (2013) shows that the famous impossible trinity or trilemma boils down to a choice between independent monetary policy and capital controls in most of the developing economies when they face a tsunami of liquidity. However, measures like capital controls are limited, especially when the domestic need for capital is high. Again, capital controls to a great extent deflect capital from one EME to another (Forbes et al., 2016). In the absence of sufficient scope to impose direct controls, EMEs mop up reserves to ensure a competitive exchange rate as well as to defend against any future depreciation.
Resource-rich economies have been observed to fall back in terms of growth and institutions (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). Development of a primary sector comes at a cost of losing out on manufacturing growth.
An endogenous test of structural breaks supports significant breaks around 2000 and 2008.
Current account balance is composed of net exports as well as remittances and other transfers. Data shows that the remittances, although a non-negligible component, is substantially stable over time for the current panel, and for developing economies at large. This finding is supported by existing studies (Ratha, 2005). Also, remittances inherently depend on external output, nominal exchange rate and other external factors which include global migration policies. Its inclusion would further complicate the analysis. For the above reasons, we choose not to include remittances.
Defined as exports minus imports in goods and services.
Unless mentioned otherwise, each variable is in terms of percentage.
We take the lagged NFA ratio following Wang (2020).
Dependency ratio is aimed to capture the impact of non-working dependent population, as per the Life Cycle Hypothesis. It is defined as number of dependents (old and young combined, e.g., < 15 or > 64 years age) per 100 working-age (15–64) population.
Such normalization is similar to Fogli and Perri (2015).
Significant persistence has been found in Saadaoui (2015) as well.
We exclude fuels because crude oil introduces the role of oil production and cartels which is not the focus here. Crude oil exporting nations have a different dimension. The same argument of excess precautionary savings does not apply there. They have retained surpluses through crude oil exports.
Life cycle hypothesis suggests consumption smoothing over the entire life span while earnings are limited only to working years. If an individual, with an average life-span T years from now, plans to work for another L years (earns Yt in current period, expects to earn Yet in (L-1) future periods), and if her initial endowment is W, she shall consume her lifetime earnings (LE) in T equal instalments.
Her savings (St) in tth period is then given by:
\(S_{t} = Y_{t} - LE/T = (1 - T^{ - 1} ) Y_{t} - (L - 1) T^{ - 1} Y_{et} - T^{ - 1} W(A)\)
Differentiating equation (A), ΔSt/ΔYt > 0, ΔSt/ΔYet and ΔSt/ΔW < 0.
More weight is given to the results of the latter which has better small sample properties.
Divergent opinion exists on the choice of instrumental variables since it can be difficult to find such variables. Anderson and Hsiao (1984)proposed that in a N*T panel, the first differenced endogenous regressors can be instrumented through past values.
Here it must be noted that GMM or the Generalized Method of Moments is commonly used for panel studies addressing endogeneity. However, for the dataset we study, we find AH method is most suitable and practical. GMM method is generally applicable for wide panels “short time series T, large cross sections N” since as a rule of thumb the number of instruments should not exceed the number of cross-sections. Since the panel we study is a “long” panel where T > > N and N is small relative to the number of instruments, it does not satisfy the pre-conditions for GMM. In the context of both difference and system GMM, Roodman (2009) notes that with larger T, the number of instruments in a GMM estimation can be very large relative to observations leading to over-identification and increases the possibility for type I errors—false positives. Hence, given the constraints in data, we use AH instrumentation and the estimates are found to be robust.
This involves regressing the test variable under consideration on exogenous variables in the system and using the residuals from these auxiliary regressions in place of the tested variable in the original regression. If the residuals are found to be significant, then this shows the null of exogeneity is rejected and points to endogeneity in the regressor.
Since we are dealing with a panel that has historical commonalities as well as strong geo-political connections, Pesaran test for cross-dependence is used.
They find − 0.11% change in CAB/GDP ratio for EMEs from increasing FD proxied through private sector credit. Their estimates, however, are based on the pre-GFC period, while ours include post-GFC years.
DUM_CRS = 1 for 1997–1998 and 2007–2008, 0 otherwise.
Similar to Arize et al. (2020).
Absolute value of net capital flows is taken in the denominator as this ensures proper change of sign for years with negative figures in the data.
This tests whether the residuals capture any additional ARCH effects. There should be no ARCH left in them if the variance equation is correctly specified.
We use a GAUSS code replicating HR test by Ranjbar et al. (2014).
D_01 = 1 for years 2001-2008.
= 0 otherwise.
D_09 = 1 for years 2009-2018.
= 0 otherwise.
The ratio was non-stationary in level, and hence its growth rate was taken.
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Valuable inputs from the Editor-in-Chief and anonymous referees of the journal are gratefully acknowledged. The authors are also grateful to Prof. Saibal Kar and Prof. Subrata Sarkar for useful comments on a preliminary version of the paper.
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Banerjee, K., Goyal, A. New perspectives on the rise and fall of global imbalances: evidence from large emerging market economies. Rev World Econ (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-023-00508-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-023-00508-2
Keywords
- Global trade imbalances
- Institutions
- Resource curse
- Precautionary savings
- Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator
- Bai-Perron test