Abstract
In this paper we provide a comparison of different voting rules in a distance-based framework with the help of computer simulations. Taking into account the informational requirements to operate such voting rules and the outcomes of two well-known reference rules, we identify the Copeland rule as a good compromise between these two reference rules. It will be shown that the outcome of the Copeland rule is “close” to the outcomes of the reference rules, but it requires less informational input and has lower computational complexity.
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Eckert, D., Klamler, C., Mitlöhner, J. et al. A distance-based comparison of basic voting rules. cent.eur.j.oper.res. 14, 377–386 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-006-0011-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-006-0011-x