Abstract
The Nash demand game (NDG) has been applied to explain moral norms of distributive justice. In NDG, two players simultaneously make demands and receive them unless the sum of the demands exceeds the amount of the resource. Otherwise, they obtain nothing. This paper proposes the demand-intensity game (D-I game), which adds an “intensity” dimension to NDG in order to discuss various scenarios for the evolution of norms concerning distributive justice. We show basic analyses of the D-I game in game theory and then evolutionary simulations. Descriptive/evolutionary approaches show that three types of norms could evolve mainly depending on the conflict cost in the game: egalitarianism, “wimpy” libertarianism and libertarianism in decreasing order of the cost. Although the wimpy libertarianism is classified as the libertarianism in the sense of claiming the full resource, it can achieve an egalitarian division without conflict cost as a result.
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Notes
These values are calculated from ESS equations.
$$ E(S, S) > E(T, S) , $$$$ E(S, S) = E(T, S)\; {\text{and}}\;E(S,T) > E(T,T) \;{\text{for}}\;{\text{all}}\;T $$S: own strategy, T: the other strategy. E(A, B): the reward of A strategy playing with B.
These values are calculated from ESS equations when own demand d = 0.5 and the other strategies (T in ESS equations) are all strategies except when d = 0.5.
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This work was presented in part at the 17th International Symposium on Artificial Life and Robotics, Oita, Japan, January 19–21, 2012.
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Kojima, K., Arita, T. How do equity norms evolve? An evolutionary game theory approach to distributive justice. Artif Life Robotics 17, 287–292 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10015-012-0057-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10015-012-0057-x