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Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly

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Abstract

We analyse merger profitability in a mixed-oligopoy Cournot model. The “merger paradox” is qualified by showing that there are profitable gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a merger to a monopoly. In particular, it is shown that merger sustainability depends on both, the privatization degree of the mixed firm and the number of non-merging firms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de A Coruña, Campus de Elviña s/n, 15071, A Coruña, Spain

    José Méndez-Naya

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  1. José Méndez-Naya
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Correspondence to José Méndez-Naya.

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Méndez-Naya, J. Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly. J Econ 94, 167–176 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0001-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0001-7

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