Abstract
We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (Econ Lett 73:131–136, 2001), and using methods of Imai (Econometrica 51:389–401, 1983), extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, J Econ Theory 45:330–341, 1988), by making the notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem change relative to the original problem.
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Notes
Lensberg calls this axiom Bilateral Stability.
This claim is more carefully motivated in Sect. 2.3.1.
Vector inequalities: \(\geqq \), \(\ge \), \(>\).
Inclusion is denoted \(\subseteq \), and strict inclusion \(\subset \).
For \(N\in \mathcal {N}\) and \(S\in \Sigma ^{N}\), the Nash solution (Nash 1950) is defined as the unique maximizer of \(\prod _{i\in N}x_{i}\) on \(S\cap \mathbb {R}^{N}_{+}\). A proportional solution is defined as \(\beta ^{*}w\) where w is some vector in \(\mathbb {R}^{N}_{++}\), and \(\beta ^{*}:=\max \{\beta \mid \beta w\in S\}\). The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975) is defined as \(K(S):=\beta ^{*}u(S)\), where \(\beta ^{*}:=\max \{\beta \mid \beta u(S)\in S\}\). The Raiffa solution is defined as the (possibly infinite) sum \(\frac{1}{|N|}u(S)+\frac{1}{|N|}u(S-\frac{1}{|N|}u(S))+\frac{1}{|N|}u(S-\frac{1}{|N|}u(S)-\frac{1}{|N|}u(S-\frac{1}{|N|}u(S)))+\ldots \).
See also Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 133).
Peters et al. refer to reduced problems as reduced games.
Given \(N\in \mathcal {N}\) and \(V\subset \mathbb {R}^{N}\), \(cch\, V\) denotes the convex comprehensive hull of (the points in) V. It is defined as the intersection of all convex and comprehensive sets in \(\mathbb {R}^{N}\) that contain (the points in) V.
See the solution D, defined in Sect. 4.1.
This proof is included in the Appendix.
For all \(Q,N\in \mathcal {N}\) with \(Q\subset N\) and \(|Q|=2\), and for all \(S\in \Sigma ^{N}\).
It is not known in general whether Imai’s (1983) lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution – and by extension, the weighted generalizations considered in this paper—can be characterized on this smaller domain.
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I thank Hans Peters, Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara for useful comments and suggestions. The usual caveat applies.
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Appendix
Appendix
This Appendix elaborates on several results of Imai (1983). In particular, Appendix 1 corresponds with Imai’s Lemmas 6 and 7, and part of his Proposition 1 (pp. 396–397). Appendix 2 is a visual illustration of Imai’s auxiliary problems. Appendix 3 is a modification of Imai’s Lemma 5, and part of his Proposition 2 (pp. 396, 398). Appendix 4 repeats the final part of that same Proposition 2.
1.1 Appendix 1: Solutions \(\varphi \in \mathcal {L}\) satisfy IM
Consider some solution \(L^{w}\in \mathcal {L}\) with \(w\in \mathbb {R}^{\mathbb {N}}_{++}\). Let \(N\in \mathcal {N}\), and let S and T be problems in \(\Sigma ^{N}\) with \(T\subseteq S\) and \(T_{-i}=S_{-i}\) for some \(i\in N\). Since \(L^{w}\) satisfies SI, we may assume without loss of generality that \(u(S)=w^{-1}_{N}\), where \(w_{N}\) is the restriction of w to the agents in N. Then
Define \(u:=u(S)u(T)^{-1}\), and observe that
By Equations (5) and (6) it is sufficient to show that \(\xi _{i}(S)\geqq \frac{1}{u_{i}}\xi _{i}(uT)\). This is done in two steps. First it is established that \(\xi _{i}(S)\geqq \xi _{i}(T)\), and subsequently, that \(\xi _{i}(T) \geqq \frac{1}{u_{i}}\xi _{i}(uT)\).
Lemma 6.1
Let \(y\in T\) with \(i\in Q(T,y)\). Then \(Q(T,y)=Q(S,y)\).
Proof
Suppose there is some \(i'\in Q(S,y)\setminus Q(T,y)\). Define \(x:=x(S,y)\) and \(x':=x(T,y)\). Since \(S_{-i}=T_{-i}\) and \(x\in S\), there is a \(z\in T\) such that \(z_{j}=x_{j}\) for all \(j\in N\setminus i\). By convexity of T it follows that \(\lambda x' +(1-\lambda ) z \in T\) for all \(\lambda \in [0,1]\). We have \(x,x'\geqq y\), \(z_{j}=x_{j}\) for all \(j\in N\setminus i\), and \(x_{i}'>y_{i}\) (since \(i\in Q(T,y)\)). Hence, there exists a \(\lambda \in (0,1)\) such that \(z^{*}:=\lambda x' +(1-\lambda ) z\geqq y\) and \(z^{*}\in T\). Since \(i'\in Q(S,y)\setminus Q(T,y)\), \(x_{i'}>y_{i'}=x_{i'}'\). Then \(z_{i'}^{*}=\lambda x_{i'}'+(1-\lambda )x_{i'}>y_{i'}\). This implies \(i'\in Q(T,y)\), a contradiction. \(\square \)
In essence, as long as the ith coordinate can be further increased in problem T, it can be further increased in S as well. It follows that \(\xi _{i}(S)\geqq \xi _{i}(T)\).
To show that \(\xi _{i}(T)\geqq \frac{1}{u_{i}}\xi _{i}(uT)\), define the following:
The aim is to show that \(x_{i}\geqq x_{i}'\).
Observation 6.2
\(x\succ _{N} x'\) and \(y'\succ _{N} y\) (or \(x=x'\) and \(y=y'\)).
Proof
Observe that \(\xi (T)\in T\), implying \(u\xi (T)\in uT\). Since \(\xi (uT)\succ _{N} z\) for all \(z\in uT\) with \(z\ne \xi (uT)\), \(\xi (uT)\succ _{N} u\xi (T)\) (or \(\xi (uT) = u\xi (T)\)). In other words, \(y'\succ _{N}y\) (or \(y'=y\)). Similarly, observe that \(\xi (uT)\in uT\), and thus \(u^{-1}\xi (uT)\in T\). Since \(\xi (T)\succ _{N} z\) for all \(z\in T\) with \(z\ne \xi (T)\), this implies \(\xi (T)\succ _{N} u^{-1}\xi (uT)\) (or \(\xi (T)= u^{-1}\xi (uT)\)). In other words, \(x\succ _{N}x'\) (or \(x=x'\)). Since \(x=x'\) if and only if \(y=y'\), the observation follows. \(\square \)
Lemma 6.3
\(x_{i}\geqq x_{i}'\).
Proof
Clearly, if \(x=x'\) and \(y=y'\), then the inequality holds trivially, and we are done. Hence, assume \(x\succ _{N} x'\) and \(y'\succ _{N} y\). Since \(y'\succ _{N} y\), there is an index \(m\leqq |N|\) such that the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (y)\) and \(\mu (y')\) are equal, and \(\mu _{m}(y')>\mu _{m}(y)\). Assume first that \(x_{i}'\geqq \mu _{m}(y')\). Since \(x'\) and \(y'\) only differ in the i-th coordinate, \(x_{i}'\geqq \mu _{m}(y')\) implies that the first m elements of \(\mu (x')\) and \(\mu (y')\) coincide. Then the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (x')\) coincide with the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (y)\). Observe that x and y only differ in the i-th coordinate and \(y_{i}>x_{i}\), so there are two possibilities:
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1.
there is some \(k\leqq m-1\) such that the first \(k-1\) elements of \(\mu (y)\) and \(\mu (x)\) coincide, and \(\mu _{k}(y)>\mu _{k}(x)\). Then the first \(k-1\) elements of \(\mu (x')\) and \(\mu (x)\) coincide and \(\mu _{k}(x')>\mu _{k}(x)\). Then \(x'\succ _{N} x\), a contradiction.
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2.
the first m elements of \(\mu (y)\) and \(\mu (x)\) coincide. Since the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (x')\) and \(\mu (y)\) coincide, this implies that the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (x)\) and \(\mu (x')\) coincide. However, the m-th element of \(\mu (x')\) coincides with the m-th element of \(\mu (y')\). Since \(\mu _{m}(y')>\mu _{m}(y)\) this implies \(\mu _{m}(x')>\mu _{m}(y)\). Since \(\mu _{m}(x)=\mu _{m}(y)\) this implies \(\mu _{m}(x')>\mu _{m}(x)\), and thus \(x'\succ _{N} x\). This is a contradiction.
It follows from the above that \(x_{i}'<\mu _{m}(y')\). Hence, \(x_{i}'=\mu _{m'}(x')\) for some \(m'\in \{1,\ldots ,m-1\}\), and take the lowest \(m'\) in case of ties. Similarly, \(x_{i}=\mu _{k}(x)\) for some \(k\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}\), and take the highest possible k in case of ties. There are two possibilities: \(k\geqq m'\) or \(k<m'\).
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1.
If \(k<m'\), then \(\mu _{k}(x')=\mu _{k}(y')\) (they only differ in the i-th coordinate; since \(\mu _{m'}(x')=x_{i}\), \(k<m'\) implies that \(\mu _{k'}(x')=\mu _{k'}(y')\) for all \(k'=1,\ldots ,k\)). Since the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (y)\) and \(\mu (y')\) coincide, and \(k<m'\leqq m-1\), the first k elements of \(\mu (y)\) and \(\mu (y')\) coincide. Since x and y only differ in the i-th coordinate and \(x_{i}=\mu _{k}(x)\), the first \(k-1\) elements of \(\mu (x)\) and \(\mu (y)\) coincide. This in turn implies that the first \(k-1\) elements of \(\mu (x)\) and \(\mu (x')\) coincide. Since \(y_{i}>x_{i}\) and by the choice of k (it was chosen such that \(\mu _{k+1}(x)>\mu _{k}(x)\)), \(\mu _{k}(y)>\mu _{k}(x)\). Since the first k elements of \(\mu (y)\) coincide with the first k elements of \(\mu (x')\), this implies \(\mu _{k}(x')>\mu _{k}(x)\). Hence, \(x'\succ _{N} x\), a contradiction.
-
2.
Let \(k\geqq m'\). Observe that the first \(m' -1\) elements of \(\mu (x')\) and \(\mu (y')\) coincide (this is so because they only differ in the i-th coordinate and \(\mu _{m'}(x')=x_{i}'\)). From before, we know that the first \(m-1\) elements of \(\mu (y)\) and \(\mu (y')\) coincide, which implies that their first \(m'\) elements coincide as well. Hence, the first \(m'-1\) elements of \(\mu (x')\) coincide with the first \(m'-1\) elements of \(\mu (y)\). Since x and y only differ in the i-th coordinate and \(x_{i}=\mu _{k}(x)\), the first \(m'\) elements of \(\mu (x)\) coincide with the first \(m'\) elements of \(\mu (y)\). Hence, the first \(m'-1\) elements of \(\mu (x)\) and \(\mu (x')\) coincide. If \(\mu _{m'}(x')>\mu _{m'}(x)\), then \(x'\succ _{N} x\), and we obtain a contradiction. Hence, \(\mu _{m'}(x')\leqq \mu _{m'}(x)\). But then \(x_{i}'=\mu _{m'}(x')\leqq \mu _{m'}(x)\leqq \mu _{k}(x)=x_{i}\), as desired.\(\square \)
1.2 Appendix 2: The Auxiliary Problems of Proposition 3.4
This section presents a worked out example of the auxiliary problems used in the proof of Proposition 3.4, for some weights vector w. Suppose that the problem and the solution outcome of a problem S are as in Fig. 12. Then \(L^{w}(S)\) is reached in two iterations, i.e., \(L^{w}(S)=x^{2}\).
Recall that \(\underline{S}^{0}=H(e(N),1)\). This problem is depicted in Fig. 13a. From \(\underline{S}^{0}\) one can construct the problem \(\overline{S}^{1}\): it is given by \(H(e(N),\alpha ^{1})\cap (e(N)-\mathbb {R}^{N}_{+})\). Thus, the half-space that determines \(\underline{S}^{0}\) slides upwards, and is intersected by a set that limits utilities to 1 (Fig. 13b).
The problem \(S^{1}\) is the intersection of S with the half-space \(H(e(N),\alpha ^{1})\) (Fig. 14a). Similarly, \(S'^{1}\) is the intersection of the problem S and the problem \(\overline{S}^{1}\) (Fig. 14a). Note that these two problems coincide. For the first iteration this is always the case.
To determine the auxiliary problems for the second iteration, one must determine \(\underline{S}^{1}\). It is equal to \(\overline{S}^{1}\), intersected by \(H(p^{2},p^{2}\cdot x^{2})\), a half-space that leaves the utilities of agent 3 free, but restricts those of agents 1 and 2 in a \(\{1,2\}\)-symmetric fashion (Fig. 15a). The problem \(\overline{S}^{2}\) is given by \(H(e(N),\alpha ^{2})\), intersected by that same half-space \(H(p^{2},p^{2}\cdot x^{2})\), and the set \((e(N)-\mathbb {R}^{N}_{+})\) that limits the utilities of all agents to 1 (Fig. 15b).
The problem \(S'^{2}\) is the intersection of \(\overline{S}^{2}\), and the original problem S (Fig. 16a). The problem \(S^{2}\) is given by the intersection of the original problem S and the half-space \(H(e(N),\alpha ^{2})\) (Fig. 16b).
1.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Claim 1
In order to show that \(u(\overline{S}^{j})=u(\underline{S}^{j})=u(S^{j})=u(S'^{j})=e(N)\) for all \(j=1,\ldots , k\), it is sufficient to show that \(e^{i}\) is in \(\overline{S}^{j}, \underline{S}^{j}, S^{j}\) and \(S'^{j}\) for each j and i. This follows from four observations.
-
(a)
\(e^{i}\in H(p^{j},\ p^{j}\cdot x^{j})\) for each i and j;
-
(b)
\(e^{i}\in H(e(N),\alpha ^{j})\) for each i and j;
-
(c)
\(e^{i}\in S\) for all i;
-
(d)
\(e^{i}\in (e(N)-\mathbb {R}^{N}_{+})\) for all i.
Note that (a), (b) and (d) together imply \(e^{i}\in \overline{S}^{j}\) for each i and j. Then by (c), \(e^{i}\in S'^{j}\) for each i and j; for \(j<k\), it is implied by (a) that each \(e^{i}\) is in \(\underline{S}^{j}\). Finally, (b) and (c) together imply \(e^{i}\in S^{j}\) for each i and j.
Observation (d) is trivial. Observation (c) follows from comprehensiveness of S and the assumption that \(u(S)=e(N)\). We now show (a) and (b). Denote \(N\setminus Q^{2}\) by Q, \(Q^{2}\) by \(Q'\), and for \(i\in Q\), denote \(Q'\cup \{i\}\) by \(Q_{i}\). Let \(\bar{w}:=(\bar{w}_{i})_{i\in N}\) where \(\bar{w}_{i}:=w_{i}/\sum _{i'\in Q}w_{i'}\) for all \(i\in N\). Note that \(\sum _{i\in Q}\bar{w}_{i}=1\).
By the supporting hyperplane theorem and the definition of \(x^{1}\), there is a \(p\in \mathbb {R}^{N}_{+}\) with \(p_{i}=0\) for all \(i\in Q'\), such that \(p\cdot z\leqq p\cdot x^{1}\) for all \(z\in S\). By observation (c), \(p\cdot e^{i}\leqq p\cdot x^{1}\) for all \(i\in Q\). Since \(p_{i}=0\) for all \(i\in Q'\), this implies \(p\cdot e(Q_{i})=p\cdot e^{i}\leqq p\cdot x^{1}\) for all \(i\in Q\). It follows that \(p\cdot \sum _{i\in Q}\bar{w}_{i}e(Q_{i})\leqq p\cdot x^{1}\). Note that \(\sum _{i\in Q}\bar{w}_{i}e(Q_{i})=\bar{w}+(e(Q')-\bar{w}e(Q'))\). Since \(p_{i}=0\) for all \(i\in Q'\), we obtain \(p\cdot \bar{w}\leqq p\cdot x^{1}\). Note that \(x^{1}=\alpha ^{1}w_{N}=[\alpha ^{1}\sum _{i\in Q}w_{i}]\bar{w}\). Then \(p\cdot \bar{w}\leqq p\cdot x^{1}\) is equivalent to \(\alpha ^{1}\sum _{i\in Q}w_{i} \geqq 1\). Hence, \(x^{1}=\alpha ^{1}w_{N}\geqq \frac{w_{N}}{\sum _{i\in Q}w_{i}}=\bar{w}\).
Since \(p^{1}\cdot e^{i}=0\) for all \(i\in N\), each \(e^{i}\) is trivially in \(H(p^{1},\ p^{1}\cdot x^{1})\). Consider some \(j\in \{2,\ldots ,k\}\). Note that \(p_{i}^{j}=0\) for all \(i\in Q^{j}\). Hence,
The inequality follows from the observation that \(N\setminus Q^{2}\) is a subset of \(N\setminus Q^{j}\). By the above, \(x^{j}\geqq x^{1}\geqq \bar{w}\). Hence, \(p^{j}\cdot x^{j}\geqq p^{j}\cdot x^{1}\geqq p^{j}\cdot \bar{w}\geqq 1\). Since \(p^{j}\cdot e^{i}\leqq 1\) for all \(i\in N\), we obtain \(p^{j}\cdot x^{j}\geqq p^{j}\cdot e^{i}\) for all \(i\in N\). This establishes observation (a).
Since \(x^{1}\geqq \bar{w}\) and \(\sum _{i\in N}\bar{w}_{i} \geqq \sum _{i\in Q}\bar{w}_{i}=1\), \(e(N)\cdot e^{i}=1\leqq e(N)\cdot \bar{w}\leqq e(N) \cdot x^{1}= \alpha ^{1}\) for all \(i\in N\). Hence, \(e^{i}\in H(e(N),\alpha ^{1})\) for all \(i\in N\). Since \(H(e(N),\alpha ^{1})\subset H(e(N),\alpha ^{j})\) for each \(1<j\leqq k\), observation (b) follows. \(\square \)
1.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 3.4 (continued)
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is concluded by the following three claims.
Claim 7
\(\varphi (\overline{S}^{1})=\varphi (\underline{S}^{1})=\varphi (S^{1})=\varphi (S'^{1})=x^{1}\).
Proof
Since \(\varphi (\underline{S}^{0})=x^{0}\), \(\varphi (\overline{S}^{1})=x^{1}\) by Claim 6. Since \(x^{1}\in \overline{S}^{1}\) and \(x^{1}\in S\), \(x^{1}\in S'^{1}\). Then \(x^{1}=\varphi (\overline{S}^{1})\in S'^{1}\subseteq \overline{S}^{1}\), and by Claim 1, \(u(S'^{1})=u(\overline{S}^{1})\). Thus by IIIA, \(\varphi (S'^{1})=\varphi (\overline{S}^{1})=x^{1}\). For all \(i\in N\setminus Q^{2}\), \(x^{1}_{i}=x^{2}_{i}\), implying \(p^{2}\cdot x^{1}=p^{2}\cdot x^{2}\). Hence, \(x^{1}\in H(p^{2}, p^{2}\cdot x^{2})\). Then \(x^{1}=\varphi (\overline{S}^{1})\in \underline{S}^{1}\subseteq \overline{S}^{1}\); by Claim 1, \(u(\underline{S}^{1})=u(\overline{S}^{1})\). Then by IIIA, \(\varphi (\underline{S}^{1})=\varphi (\overline{S}^{1})=x^{1}\). To see that \(\varphi (S^{1})=x^{1}\), observe first that \(S'^{1}=S^{1}\cap (e(N)-\mathbb {R}^{N}_{+})\). Since \(\varphi (S^{1})\leqq u(S^{1})=e(N)\), \(\varphi (S^{1})\in (e(N)-\mathbb {R}^{N}_{+})\). Hence, \(\varphi (S^{1})\in S'^{1}\subseteq S^{1}\), and by Claim 1, \(u(S'^{1})=u(S^{1})\). Thus, \(\varphi (S^{1})=\varphi (S'^{1})=x^{1}\) by IIIA. \(\square \)
Claim 8
\(\varphi (\overline{S}^{j})=\varphi (\underline{S}^{j})=\varphi (S^{j})=\varphi (S'^{j})=x^{j}\) for each \(j=1,\ldots ,k\) (or \(j=1,\ldots ,k-1\) for \(\varphi (\underline{S}^{j})\)).
Proof
Consider \(j\in \{2,\ldots ,k\}\), and assume \(\varphi (\overline{S}^{j-1})=\varphi (\underline{S}^{j-1})=\varphi (S^{j-1})=\varphi (S'^{j-1})=x^{j-1}\). By Claim 6, \(\varphi (\overline{S}^{j})=x^{j}\). Then \(\varphi (S'^{j})=x^{j}\) follows as in Claim 7. Furthermore, if \(j<k\), then also \(\varphi (\underline{S}^{j})=x^{j}\) follows as in Claim 7. What is left to show is that \(\varphi (S^{j})=x^{j}\). To this end, it is first argued that \(\varphi (S^{j})\) is an element of \(\overline{S}^{j}\).
-
1.
Since \(S^{j}\subseteq H(e(N),\alpha ^{j})\), \(\varphi (S^{j})\in H(e(N),\alpha ^{j})\).
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2.
Since \(\varphi (S^{j})\leqq u(S^{j})=e(N)\), \(\varphi (S^{j})\in (e(N)-\mathbb {R}^{N}_{+})\).
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3.
By part (ii) of Lemma 3.5, \(S_{-i}^{j-1}=S_{-i}^{j}\) for all \(i\in N\). Furthermore, \(S^{j-1}\subseteq S^{j}\). Thus by an |N|-fold application of IM, \(\varphi (S^{j})\geqq \varphi (S^{j-1})=x^{j-1}\). As in Claim 3, this implies \(\varphi _{i}(S^{j})=x_{i}^{j}\) for all \(i\in N\setminus Q^{j}\). From this it follows that for all \(j'\in \{1,\ldots ,j\}\), \(\varphi (S^{j})\in H(p^{j'},p^{j'}\cdot x^{j'})\). Thus, \(\varphi (S^{j})\in \bigcap _{j'=1}^{j}H(p^{j'},p^{j'}\cdot x^{j'})\).
It follows that \(\varphi (S^{j})\in \overline{S}^{j}\). Since \(S^{j}\subseteq S\), we further have \(\varphi (S^{j})\in S\). Thus, \(\varphi (S^{j})\in S'^{j}\subseteq S^{j}\), and by Claim 1, \(u(S^{j})=u(S'^{j})\). Then by IIIA, \(\varphi (S^{j})=\varphi (S'^{j})=x^{j}\). \(\square \)
Claim 9
\(\varphi (S)=x^{k}\).
Proof
Since \(S^{k}=S\cap H(e(N),\alpha ^{k})\), \(\varphi (S)\geqq \varphi (S^{k})\) by an |N|-fold application of IM and part (ii) of Lemma 3.5. Then by Claim 8, \(\varphi (S)\geqq x^{k}\). The claim follows from the observation that \(x^{k}\in P(S)\). \(\square \)
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Driesen, B. Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions. Soc Choice Welf 46, 777–809 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x