Abstract
We extend the theoretical and experimental analysis of endogenous sorting in social dilemma games to decisions of trustees in trust games. Trustees first decide about the amount they send back if the trustor sends the money and then learn that they can exit the game for a payoff that is identical to the trustor’s endowment. We develop a behavioral model where trustors and trustees have reciprocal preferences, and hence put positive weight on the other player’s payoff if they perceive their behavior as kind. Our model yields two possible constellations: Only trustees with high reciprocity participate, or all types except those with intermediate reciprocity participate. Our data lend strong support for the second pattern, as we observe a U-shaped relation between the trustees’ participation rate and the amount they return. Trustors are hence left with an extreme pool of participants where they are either matched with particularly selfish or generous trustees.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Andreoni, J., Rao, J.M., Trachtman, H.: Avoiding the ask: a field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving. J. Polit. Econ. 125(3), 625–653 (2017)
Bohnet, I., Kübler, D.: Compensating the cooperators: is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible? J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 56(1), 61–76 (2005)
Broberg, T., Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M.: Is generosity involuntary? Econ. Lett. 94(1), 32–37 (2007)
Brülhart, M., Usunier, J.-C.: Does the trust game measure trust? Econ. Lett. 115(1), 20–23 (2012)
Cain, D.M., Dana, J., Newman, G.E.: Giving versus giving in. Acad. Manag. Ann. 8(1), 505–533 (2014)
Cox, J.C.: How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 46(2), 260–281 (2004)
Cox, J.C., Deck, C.A.: On the nature of reciprocal motives. Econ. Inq. 43(3), 623–635 (2005)
Cox, J.C., Friedman, D., Gjerstad, S.: A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness. Games Econom. Behav. 59(1), 17–45 (2007)
Dana, J., Cain, D.M., Dawes, R.M.: What you don’t know won’t hurt me: costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 100(2), 193–201 (2006)
DellaVigna, S., List, J.A., Malmendier, U.: Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. Q. J. Econ. 127(1), 1–56 (2012)
DellaVigna, S., List, J.A., Malmendier, U., Rao, G.: Voting to tell others. Rev. Econ. Stud. 84(1), 143–181 (2016)
Di Bartolomeo, G., Papa, S.: Does meditation lead to more selfish or pro-social behaviors in a trust game? Technical report, Department of Communication, University of Teramo (2015)
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M.: A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Q. J. Econ. 114(3), 817–868 (1999)
Guido, A., Robbett, A., Romaniuc, R.: Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: a survey and meta-analytic evidence. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 159, 192–209 (2019)
Hauk, E., Nagel, R.: Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner’s dilemma games: an experimental study. J. Conflict Resolut. 45(6), 770–793 (2001)
Keser, C., Montmarquette, C.: Voluntary versus enforced team effort. Games 2(3), 277–301 (2011)
Klinowski, D.: Reluctant donors and their reactions to social information. Exp. Econ. 24(2), 515–535 (2021)
Lazear, E.P., Malmendier, U., Weber, R.A.: Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences. Am. Econ. J. Appl. Econ. 4(1), 136–163 (2012)
McCabe, K.A., Rigdon, M.L., Smith, V.L.: Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 52(2), 267–275 (2003)
Nosenzo, D., Tufano, F.: The effect of voluntary participation on cooperation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 142, 307–319 (2017)
Orbell, J.M., Dawes, R.M.: Social welfare, cooperators’ advantage, and the option of not playing the game. Am. Sociol. Rev. 58(6), 787–800 (1993)
Orbell, J.M., Schwartz-Shea, P., Simmons, R.T.: Do cooperators exit more readily than defectors? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 78, 147–162 (1984)
Funding
Open access funding provided by University of Innsbruck and Medical University of Innsbruck.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
We are grateful to Frauke v. Bieberstein, Jan Feld, Stefen Lippert, Gerd Muehlheusser, James Tremewan, and seminar participants at the Universities of Auckland and Wellington for helpful remarks. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF, SFB F63) and a Faculty Research Grant from Victoria School of Business and Governance are gratefully acknowledged.
Rights and permissions
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
About this article
Cite this article
Feess, E., Kerzenmacher, F. Sorting of trustees: the good and the bad stay in the game. Econ Theory (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01491-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01491-3