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A decomposition algorithm for N-player games

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Abstract

An N-player game can be decomposed by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes profiles of strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when players’ optimal replies agree with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite, a solution of an associated linear complementarity problem yields an equilibrium of the approximate game and thus an approximate equilibrium of the original game. Computational efficiency is improved by using vertices of a triangulation of the players’ strategy space for the coordinator’s pure strategies. Computational experience is reported.

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Correspondence to Robert Wilson.

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This work was funded in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

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Govindan, S., Wilson, R. A decomposition algorithm for N-player games. Econ Theory 42, 97–117 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0434-4

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