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Configuring a profile-deviation-analysis to statistical test complementarity effects from balanced management control systems in a configurational fit approach

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Abstract

This paper develops novel test formulas able to test performance effects from balancing control forms in management control systems using the notion of complementarity. Extant research has underlined the importance of researching and understanding complementarity effects stemming from multiple control forms—i.e., management control systems. In configurations of management controls, a number of control forms work interdependently. In some cases, these interdependencies produce complementarity effects, which previous literature has not captured in full, as synergy effects from interdependencies in configurations are often treated implicitly or tested too reductionistic. Previously used statistical test techniques and formulas have not been fully developed to test performance effects using a configurational fit approach that accounts for complementarity effects from balancing multiple control forms and roles of management accountants (finance functions). In configurations of management control systems, control forms and/or roles of management accountants can be balanced to fit local optima for each control form, and simultaneously fitting the distance, i.e. balance, to other control forms/roles, in which the latter can produce complementarity effects. This balance type of complementarity is a subset of the broader notion of complementarity. To move research forward, new formulas are developed that is suited to testing complementarity effects from balancing management control forms. In this way, the black box of how configurations of control forms produce performance is being opened, yet not completely, to better examine how they collectively produce performance. The developed test formulas are illustrated using survey-data on whether multiple roles of management accountants can affect performance in a complementing manner given the strategy of the company they serve.

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Notes

  1. Under the configuration approach Gerdin and Greve (2004) distinct between contingency (including performance) and congruence (excludes performance—based on equilibrium assumption). We focus on the configuration-contingency form of fit, which Gerdin and Greve (2004) credits to Drazin and Van de Ven´s (1985) systems fit.

  2. Systems are difficult to imitate, as the imitator needs to realize, implement and sustain all elements/variables, and using probability accounting, the overall success rate of imitating will drop to a low level if each of these has an individual success rate of, e.g., 90%.

  3. In the literature, different terms are used: control forms, control practices, and control mechanisms. In the context of this paper, there is no need to distinguish between them. Management Controls Systems involve different control forms such as output control, social control, behavioral control, input control, and may encompass management accounting approaches such as budgets, incentives, standardization, rules and routines. See Malmi and Brown (2008) for a framework on management control systems or an overview in van der Kolk et al. (2018).

  4. Ennen and Richter (2010) note that the complementarity approach is on a meso level, as it does not give an ex ante prediction of how certain/specific variables behave or how exact configurations are performing.

  5. Milgrom and Roberts credit Edgeworth for the notion of complementarity. Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist, was also a pioneer studying complementarity effects, as he used this to study whether protons behave as waves or particles.

  6. Balance is the distance (e.g. one control form is leveled at 2, and another at 5, the distance is 3) between the control forms. This may involve an ideal distance between these where performance is optimized.

  7. Ideal is defined as the level of variables in a configuration where performance is maximized, and nonsymmetrical ideal is where the ideal level is not based on variables having the same level—e.g., three control forms may be ideal at the levels 3,2, and 5 on a scale from 1 to 7.

  8. We use the term “choice variable” (CV) in the same way as Milgrom and Roberts (1995), where these are the variables for which firms can choose the level. Hence, they are internal variables such as choosing the level of management control forms. Given this, external variables known from contingency theory are excluded.

  9. Choice variables may be balanced in a way that creates dynamic tensions that are positive for performance. In the concluding remarks, we propose multiple applications.

  10. We later use the competing value framework (e.g. Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981; Denison et al. 1995) to organize to roles, and they use this term.

  11. Nor exclude.

  12. A typical way to model complementarity effects in a regression analysis is through an interaction term (multiplication) of the control form variables. This interaction term will not systematically reveal the complementarity effects stemming from balancing control forms. This is further explained in Sect. 3 and subsections to this.

  13. As modeled in Sect. 3.

  14. In profile-deviation-analysis there is only an explicit interaction between the segment criterion and the Euclidean distance (this is calculated for all the other CVs in the system).

  15. Using a polynomial/quadric regression, this technique can even handle ideals that are not at the end of scales (non-symmetrical).

  16. The city-block element of the Kristensen and Israelsen (2014) approach is unproblematic even with non-symmetrical ideal states, as it is just an adjustment of the ideal state values (not at end of scale), which we do later in our developed formulas in Sect. 3.2.1. Yet with non-symmetrical ideal the latter element (which combines city-block with Euclidean distance) introduces non-systematic operationalization of complementarity. Let us illustrate this with a concise example using only two variable. The ideal configuration of them is 4 and 3, hence the ideal balance-distance is 1 (4–3). One company is valued at 5 and 2 on these dimensions and another company valued at 3 and 2. For both companies the city block distance is the same—equals 2, so based on additivity similar performance would be predicted as they have similar misfit when measured solely on city-block distance. This seems reasonable if additively is expected, and not complementarity. The Euclidean distance to the ideal is for both companies 1.414, even though the variables have very different balances between them. For the first company the difference between the variables is only 1, and in the second company the difference is 3. In the ideal state the ideal-balance-distance is 1, which is exactly the value of the first company. Thus, we would expect company 1 to perform better, as the balance is not thwarted, which is in company 2. Yet the “difference” between the city-block and Euclidean distance (as used in Kristensen and Israelsen 2014) does not reflect this, as the Euclidean distance is 1.414 for both cases (and the city-block is also equal). Me.

  17. If there are missing values in the observations this may distort the sum values for α and for δ. Averages can be used instead, or use missing sum value, or impute the missing values are different solutions to missing values.

  18. The control variables are not shown in any of the formulas. Naturally, they should be included when utilizing this formula. Yet, the independent effects of management control practices are included in the formulas in the term “α” (first part of the basic equation) aggregated, as this represent the individual distance of each management control practice distance to the ideal of this particular practice. A disaggregation of this is found below in the next formula, where each management control practice has its own slope.

  19. Researchers should also consider testing for robustness of profile-deviation-analysis. Robustness checks such as holdout samples or comparing a baseline model to actual profile deviation (Venkatraman 1989) are important checks of whether cut-off values that constitutes the best-performer group are the sole driver of significance of results.

  20. And is comparable to the alternative formulas developed in “Appendix D”.

  21. We analyze in Sect. 3.2.1 why this is complementarity. Moreover, the practical example of finance functions exemplifies how this can be understood as complementarity.

  22. The labels and theoretical foundations of the roles of management accountants are based on the competing values framework (e.g., Denison et al. 1995), as this framework can capture the categorization of multiple roles and their relations in an organization. Mahlendorf (2014) concludes that the roles of finance functions (management accountants) are only vaguely theoretically developed, which we do somewhat overcome by using the competing values framework. The competing values framework builds on the notion of complementarity between the roles with an underlying paradoxical/tension approach (e.g., Shin and Park 2019).

  23. Conventional assumptions of the regression analysis apply, and it should be tested to ensure that these are not violated.

  24. We only use the dataset to illustrate the new formulas as an example of how to apply them.

  25. If the researcher suspects, based on prior theory, that certain control elements do not contribute to the complementarity effects, then the researcher should try to run the test formulas with and without these variables to study the differences (Venktraman and Prescott 1990). Another test approach would be to use fsQCA to indicate which control forms are relevant in a control package/system, as suggested by Bedford et al. (2016).

  26. Results not reported elsewhere in this paper.

  27. SEM results not reported elsewhere in this paper. Additional note: if we use the distance variables (earlier used to calculate α), the pattern is similar, yet the latent construct is closer to being significant (negative, as expected) on ROIC.

  28. We suspect the following could be improved to get better results: Better measurement of the roles (multiple questions), calibration of ideals based on industries, inclusion of better control variables. Or maybe there is not complementarity effects present, but merely additive effects.

  29. E.g., Y(Performance) = β0 + β1 x + β2 y + β3z + β4 (x–y) + β5 (y–z) + β6(x–z) +β7x2 + β8y2 + β9z2 + β10 (x–y)2 + β11 (y–z)2 + β12(x–z)2 + ε—where x, y, and z are the levels of the three control form variables, and beta 4 to beta 6 represent the simple balance terms. We tested this for our illustrative example, and it only confirmed that there are no testable complementarity effects from balancing the roles, as some of the betas have the wrong directions. We used the absolute distance in the balance calculations; the correctness of this approach can be debated in future research, as in, for example, 4 − 2 = 2 and 2 − 4 = − 2 (hence, absolute value is also 2 here), given two situations with different values of two roles/control forms, the same absolute distance can be derived. Nevertheless, it may matter whether the first control form/role is higher (the first has a value of 4, and the second has a value of 2) or lower than the second (if the first has a value of 2 and the second has a value of 4).

  30. To keep the formula simple, three-way interactions are not included. Also, each interaction term could have its own beta value. The formula could also include more or less than three CVs. These considerations apply to both formulas (2) and (3) in this section.

  31. A simple example could be the positive performance effect from having the right tension between the finance function, just as a police officer and business partner can complement the relation (right tension) between being a scorecard keeper and a business partner.

  32. The interaction term may still have the challenges discussed earlier for previously used statistical techniques. This is the three-way interaction challenge, and the potential difficulty in distinguishing a moderator from an interaction effect.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Professor Poul Israelsen, Claus Højmark, and Niels Sandalgaard for suggestions and comments on earlier versions of the paper. The first author also likes to thank Stanford Professor Paul Milgrom for a brief and constructive dialogue regarding the paper. We also want to acknowledge and thank the two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, as the paper has improved by implementing their ideas. Editor-in-chief Professor Thomas Guenther has provided helpful guidance through the review process, which we thank him for.

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Appendices

Appendix A: A calculation example

This appendix will show a simple calculation example of the basic formula presented in the paper. The example is based on the same numbers as in Fig. 1, but with an extra CV.

The formula is: Y(Performance) = β0 + β1(|X − x| + |Y − y| + |Z − z|) + β2(|A − a| + |B − b| + |C − c|).

Let us assume the ideal configuration as having the values:

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {{\text{X}} = 4} & {{\text{Y}} = 2} & {{\text{Z}} = 3} \\ \end{array} $$

And the values for one specific organization (that does not constitute part of the ideal configuration) are:

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {{\text{x}} = 4} & {{\text{y}} = 2} & {{\text{z}} = 3} \\ \end{array} $$

Then

$$ \begin{aligned} {\text{Y}}_{{ ( {\text{Performance)}}}} &=\upbeta_{0} +\upbeta_{1} \left( {\left| {4 - 5} \right| + \left| {2 - 1} \right| + \left| {3 - 3} \right|} \right) +\upbeta_{2} \left( {\left| {(4 - 2) - (5 - 1)} \right|} \right) \\ & \quad + \left| {\left( {(4 - 3) - (5 - 3) + \left| {(2 - 3) - (1 - 3)} \right|} \right)} \right|\\ &\downarrow \\&{\text{Y}}_{{ ( {\text{Performance)}}}} =\upbeta_{0} +\upbeta_{1} \left( {1 + 1 + 0} \right) +\upbeta_{2} \left( {2 + 1 + 1} \right) \\&\downarrow\\& {\text{Y}}_{{ ( {\text{Performance)}}}} =\upbeta_{0} +\upbeta_{1} (2) +\upbeta_{2} (4) \end{aligned} $$

This is calculated for all cases outside the ideal configurations. This will change the values of the small capital letters, x,y,z. It should be noted that there are often multiple ideal configurations. The beta values will also be negative; otherwise, it is difficult to interpret.

Calculation examples of the possible extensions/alterations of the basic formula are not presented in this appendix.

Appendix B

Questionnaire item on strategy

Strategy

Please indicate the description of firms below that fit the most to your firm

Prospector

These businesses are frequently the first-to-market with new product or service concepts

 

They do not hesitate to enter new market segments where there appears to be an opportunity

 

These businesses concentrate on offering products that push performance boundaries

 

Their proposition is an offer of the most innovative product, whether based on dramatic performance improvement or cost reduction

Analyzer

These businesses are seldom ‘first-in’ with new products or services or to enter emerging market segments

 

However, by carefully monitoring competitors’ actions and customers’ responses to them

 

They can be ‘early-followers’ with a better targeting strategy, increased customer benefits, or lower total costs

Defender

These businesses attempt to maintain a relatively stable domain by aggressively protecting their product–market position

 

They rarely are at the forefront of product or service development; instead they focus on producing goods or services as efficiently as possible

 

These businesses generally focus on increasing share in existing markets by providing products at the best prices

Reactor

These businesses do not appear to have a consistent product–market orientation

 

They primarily act to respond to competitive or other market pressures in the short term

Questionnaire items on three roles of finance functions (management accountants)

Role

Variable

Question

  

Please indicate the frequency of which the finance function perform the following activities

Adhocracy

X

Develops and evaluates investment opportunities for the business (for example involvement in new markets, or investment in new production facilities)

Compete

Y

Advices other functions (departments) with respect to reaching financial and non-financial goals

Control

Z

Variance analysis of cost and revenue incurred in other functions (departments)

 
  

1: never, 2: very rarely, 3: rarely, 4: occasionally, 5: frequently, 6: very frequently, 7: always

Appendix C

Documentation of all formulas to prepare data analysis from excel before testing. Showing the first 13 cases (answers/companies). Ideal profile values (used in Column F, G, H) are calculated before using the average of 10% best performers for each of the four strategy groups. Notice the head-line counts as the first row

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

email (hidden)

Comp. No

x

y

z

X_ideal

Y_ideal

Z_ideal

X_minus_x_absolute_city_block

Y_minus_y_absolute_city_block

Z_minus_z_absolute_city_block

α_TOTAL_diff_city_block

a_x_minus_y

 

1

4.0

3.0

3.0

Part of ideal profile

     

1.00

 

2

1.0

2.0

5.0

Part of ideal profile

     

− 1.00

 

3

1.0

3.0

4.0

Part of ideal profile

     

− 2.00

 

4

4.0

3.0

4.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

2.00

0.33

0.00

2.33

1.00

 

5

4.0

5.0

6.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

2.00

2.33

2.00

6.33

− 1.00

 

6

2.0

4.0

7.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

0.00

1.33

3.00

4.33

− 2.00

 

7

3.0

6.0

6.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

1.00

3.33

2.00

6.33

− 3.00

 

8

4.0

6.0

7.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

2.00

3.33

3.00

8.33

− 2.00

 

9

2.0

4.0

5.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

0.00

1.33

1.00

2.33

− 2.00

 

10

7.0

5.0

7.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

5.00

2.33

3.00

10.33

2.00

 

11

6.0

7.0

7.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

4.00

4.33

3.00

11.33

− 1.00

 

12

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

2.7

4.0

3.00

1.33

1.00

5.33

1.00

A

B

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

X

Y

email (hidden)

Comp. No

b_y_minus_z

c_x_minus_z

A_ideal

B_ideal

C_ideal

A_minus_a_absolute

B_minus_b_absolute

C_minus_c_absolute

δ_TOTAL_difF_A_B_C

interaction_α_δ_1

interaction_δ_2

interactions_in_α_3

 

1

0.00

1.00

          
 

2

− 3.00

− 4.00

          
 

3

− 1.00

− 3.00

          
 

4

− 1.00

0.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

1.67

0.33

2.00

4.00

9.33

4.56

0.67

 

5

− 1.00

− 2.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

0.33

0.33

0.00

0.67

4.22

0.11

13.33

 

6

− 3.00

− 5.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

1.33

1.67

3.00

6.00

26.00

11.22

4.00

 

7

0.00

− 3.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

2.33

1.33

1.00

4.67

29.55

6.78

12.00

 

8

− 1.00

− 3.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

1.33

0.33

1.00

2.67

22.22

2.11

22.67

 

9

− 1.00

− 3.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

1.33

0.33

1.00

2.67

6.22

2.11

1.33

 

10

− 2.00

0.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

2.67

0.67

2.00

5.33

55.12

8.45

33.66

 

11

0.00

− 1.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

0.33

1.33

1.00

2.67

30.21

2.11

42.33

 

12

1.00

2.00

− 0.67

− 1.33

− 2.00

1.67

2.33

4.00

8.00

42.66

19.89

8.33

Appendix D: Alternative approaches to calculate complementarity from a balance approach

In this appendix, three possible extensions/alterations to the main formula (found in Sect. 3.2.1) are presented. First, a possible third section (β3) is added to the formula below. It is the interaction between α and δ, both of which are explained in the previous section. This interaction term represents a complementarity effect resulting from having CVs closer to the ideal state and having the ideal balance between these CVs. Thus, the return from being close to the ideal state will increase if the balance between the same CVs is close to the ideal balance. In this respect, an incomplete implementation of management control forms twarts performance more than if only the effects from α or δ are significantly present. It is expected that all beta values including the interaction term are negative. Adding this interaction term is inspired by Cao et al. (2009) and by Bedford et al. (2018). Cao et al. (2009) also operationalize an interaction term for the balance between exploration and exploitation strategies’ effect on performance. Yet, they do not operate with nonsymmetrical ideal states.

$$ {\text{Y}}_{{ ( {\text{Performance)}}}} =\upbeta_{0} +\upbeta_{1}\upalpha +\upbeta_{2}\updelta +\upbeta_{3}\upalpha \updelta +\upvarepsilon $$
(1)

A second possible complementarity extension to the basic formula presented in the previous section could be interaction effects between the distances used to calculate δ. This represents the complementarity effect on performance by having reduced the imbalance between CVs simultaneously. Hence, it is the joint product effect of having CVs closer to the right balance between sets of CVs.Footnote 30 It can be understood as complementarity effects between relations of CVs, which is not just complementarity between CVs, but also between relations.Footnote 31 If all three betas are significantly negative, the performance effect stems from CVs (1) being closer to the ideal state, (2) being more balanced as in the ideal state, and (3) having their joint effect more in balance.

$$ {\text{Y}}_{{ ( {\text{Performance)}}}} =\upbeta_{0} +\upbeta_{1}\upalpha +\upbeta_{2}\updelta +\upbeta_{3} \left( {\left| {{\text{A}} - {\text{a}}} \right| \cdot \left| {{\text{B}} - {\text{b}}\left| { + } \right|{\text{A}} - {\text{a}}} \right| \cdot \left| {{\text{C}} - {\text{c}}\left| + \right|{\text{B}} - {\text{b}}} \right| \cdot |{\text{C}} - {\text{c}}|} \right) +\upvarepsilon $$
(2)

A third possible complementarity extension or alteration of the basic formula is to add a section containing the interactions between the distances to ideal states of the CVs. This will be the interaction of the distances contained in α. Hence, the performance effect from one CV getting closer to the ideal state depends on the level of the distance that the other CVs have to the ideal state.

This is closer to the conventional complementarity test with an interaction termFootnote 32 representing the joint product of CVs with complementarity effects when the distance to the ideal state is minimized for multiple CVs. This is especially the case if β2 is insignificant. Therefore, if only β1 and the interaction term are significant, and thus β2 is not, it would still be an interesting finding of complementarities, as it represents a conventional complementarity effect without any distinct respect to the balance between control forms. Yet, the ideal state of CVs may still be nonsymmetrical. Thus, maximizing is not always better. When β2 is insignificant, or absent from the formula, this represents a complementarity notion that could be described as “doing a thing closer to the ideal level increases the returns of doing other things closer to their ideal level.”

If all three betas are significantly negative, the performance effect stems from CVs being closer to the ideal state, balancing them more as in the ideal state, and the joint effect of them being closer to the ideal state.

$$ {\text{Y}}_{{ ( {\text{Performance)}}}} =\upbeta_{0} +\upbeta_{1}\upalpha +\upbeta_{2}\updelta +\upbeta_{3} \left( {\left| {{\text{X}} - {\text{x}}} \right| \cdot \left| {{\text{Y}} - {\text{y}}\left| { + } \right|{\text{X}} - {\text{x}}} \right| \cdot \left| {{\text{Z}} - {\text{z}}\left| + \right|{\text{X}} - {\text{x}}} \right| \cdot |{\text{Z}} - {\text{z}}|} \right) +\upvarepsilon $$
(3)

In sum, both the base formula and the three possible alterations/extensions all comply with the definition of complementarities provided by Brynolfsson and Milgrom (2013). The formulas just show different ways of how the complementarity effect arises from configurations. Thus, they are different ways to operationalize their notion of complementarity. This should help to open the black box, yet not completely, of how relations between multiple control forms produce complementarity effects in configurations of control forms.

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Kristensen, T.B., Nielsen, H. Configuring a profile-deviation-analysis to statistical test complementarity effects from balanced management control systems in a configurational fit approach. J Manag Control 30, 439–475 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00187-019-00292-x

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