Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Zur Funktion von Studiengebühren angesichts von Informationsasymmetrien auf Humankapitalmärkten

  • Studiengebühren
  • Published:
Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Summary

Institutions of Higher Education certify students’ quality by issuing degrees and other credentials. Information asymmetries between the university and its clients, however, require valid signals of the universities’ quality, too. A performance based university compensation scheme can be viewed as a bonding-mechanism. Tuition which is not contingent on the value added through Higher Education extenuates the mechanism’s efficiency. We show that tuition nevertheless can create economic value, preventing an adverse selection of wealthy but less talented students and individuals who consume education rather than investing in future earnings. In addition, tuition increases the signaling content of some degrees. Individuals from groups more likely to consume education, like women for example, are able to signal their intention to engage in a lasting and demanding career. Thus, the allocation in some segments of the labor market can be improved.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Literaturverzeichnis

  • Akerlof, George A. (1970), The Market for „Lemons“: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, S. 488–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Franklin (1984): Reputation and Product Quality, in: Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, S. 311–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1973), Higher Education as a Filter, in: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 2, S. 193–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, Kenneth J. (1996), The Theory of Risk Bearing: Small and Great Risks, in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, No. 2/3, S. 103–111.

  • Becker, Gary S. (1962), Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70, S. 9–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowen, William G./ Bok, Derek Curtis / Burkhart, Glenda (1999), A Report Card on Diversity: Lessons for Business from Higher Education, in: Harvard Business Review, Vol. 77, S. 139–149.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braun, Markus (1998), Goldenes Zeitalter für US-Unis, in: Die Welt, 18. 5. 1998, S. 1.

  • Bulkeley, William M. (1999), Ivy League Blues: Some Yale Alumni Realize They Owe College Lasting Debt, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, Vol. 17, No. 19, S. 1, 5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Casper, Gerhard (1995), Come the Millennium, Where the University, in: Minerva, Vol. 34, S. 69–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, Burton R. (1983), The Higher Education System.

  • Clotfelter, Charles T. (1991), Financial Aid and Public Policy, in: Clotfelter, Charles T. et al. (eds.), Economic Challenges in Higher Education, S. 89–123.

  • Darby, Michael R./ Karni, Edi (1973), Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 16, S. 67–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deckers, Daniel (1996), Umgekehrter Generationenvertrag — Studiengebühren an der Universität Witten-Herdecke, in: Die Welt, 28. 8. 1996, S. 12.

  • Eng, Lili/Heller, Karen (1996), Financial aid is eating away at colleges’ fiscal health, in: The Philadelphia Inquirer, 1. 4.1996.

  • Franck, Egon/ Jungwirth, Carola (1998), Vorurteile als Karrierebremse? Ein Versuch zur Erklärung des Glass Ceiling-Phänomens, in: zfbf, 50. Jg., S. 1083–1097.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck, Egon/ Opitz, Christian (1999), Hochschulen als „Sortiereinrichtungen in Humankapitalmärkten, in: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 69. Jg., S. 1313–1329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Froomkin, Joseph (1990), The Impact of Changing Levels of Financial Resources on the Structure of Colleges and Universities, in: Hoenack, Stephen A./Collins, Eileen L. (eds.), The Economics of American Universities, S. 189–214.

  • Getz, Malcolm/Siegfried, John J. (1991), Cost Inflation, in: Clotfelter, Charles T. et al. (eds.), Economic Challenges in Higher Education, S. 261–285.

  • Hansen, W. Lee/Stampen, Jacob O. (1989), The Financial Squeeze on Higher Education Institutions and Students: Balancing Quality and Access in the Financing of Higher Education, hier zitiert nach dem Wiederabdruck, in: Breneman, David W./Leslie, Lary L./Anderson, Richard E. (eds.) (1993), The ASHE Reader on Finance in Higher Education, S. 291–302.

  • Hart, Oliver (1983), Optimal Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information, in: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 50, S. 3–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jungwirth, Carola (1998), Die beruflichen Ein- und Aufstiegschancen von Frauen — Förderwirkung und Barrieren durch MuSchG und BerzGG.

  • Kaas, Klaus Peter (1990), Marketing als Bewältigung von Informations- und Unsicherheitsproblemen im Markt, in: Die Betriebswirtschaft, 50. Jg., S. 539–548.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, Benjamin/ Leffler, K. B. (1981): The Role of Market Forces in assuring Contractual Performance, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, S. 615–642.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kreps, David/ Wilson, R. (1982): Reputation and Imperfect Information, in: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 21, S. 253–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, Alan B./Bowen, William G. (1993), Income-Contingent College Loans, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, S. 192–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Layard, Richard/ Psacharopoulos, George (1974), The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, S. 985–998.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, Paul/Roberts, John (1992), Economics, Organization and Management.

  • Michaelowa, Axel/ Michaelowa, Katharina (1995), Private Beteiligung an der Hochschulfinanzierung, in: Das Hochschulwesen, 4. Jg., S. 253–257.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, Philip (1970), Information and Consumer Behaviour, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78, S. 311–329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • o. V. (1999), US-Privatunis — Geld ohne Ende, in: Das Wirtschaftsstudium, 28. Jg., S. 148.

  • Phelps, Edmund S. (1972), The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, S. 659–661.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quigley, John M./Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1993), Public Choices in Public Higher Education, in: Clotfelter, Charles T./Rothschild, Michael (eds.), Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher Education, S. 243–284.

  • Richter, Wolfram F./ Eufinger, Barbara (1993), Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zum Thema Studiengebühren, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 73. Jg., S. 384–388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riley, John G. (1979), Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, S. 227–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, Sherwin (1996), Book Review of „The Winner Take All Society“ by Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, in: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34, S. 133–135.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothschild, Michael/White, Lawrence J. (1993), The University in the Market Place: Some Insights and some Puzzles, in: Clotfelter, Charles T./Rothschild, Michael (eds.), Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher Education.

  • Salop, Joanne/ Salop, Steven (1976), Self-selection and Turnover in the Labor Market, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, S. 619–627.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salop, Steven/ White, Lawrence J. (1991), Policy Watch — Antitrust goes to College, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, S. 193–202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schapiro, Morton Owen (1993), The Concept of Productivity as Applied to U.S. Higher Education, in: McPherson, Michael S./Schapiro, Morton Owen/Winston, Gordon C. (eds.), Paying the Piper: Productivity, Incentives, and Financing in U.S. Higher Education, S. 37–68.

  • Schmidt, Hartmut (1984), Die Finanzierung der Hochschulausbildung: Eine ökonomische Analyse, in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 104. Jg., S. 151–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwirten, Christian (1998), Erste Studiengebühren in Baden-Württemberg, Sachsen und Berlin: Verteilungsgerechtigkeit und allokative Effizienz aus ökonomischer Sicht, in: Beiträge zur Hochschulforschung, Heft 3/1998, S. 225–254.

  • Shapiro, Edward S. (1963), Long-term Student Loans: A Program for Repayment According to „Ability to Pay“.

  • Silber, John (1994), How the Earthlings pay for College — A view from Mars, in: Finifter, David H./Hauptman, Arthur M. (eds.), America’s Investment in Liberal Education.

  • Solmon, Lewis C. (1973), The Definition and Impact of College Quality, in: Solmon Lewis C./Taubman, Paul J. (eds.), Does College Matter?

  • Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft; CHE Centrum für Hochschulentwicklung (1998) (Hrsg.), Modell für einen Beitrag der Studierenden zur Finanzierung der Hochschulen (Studienbeitragsmodell).

  • Taubman, Paul J./ Wales, Terence J. (1973), Higher Education, Mental Ability, and Screening, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, S. 28–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tietzel, Manfred/ van der Beek Kornelia/ Müller, Christian (1998), Was ist eigentlich an den Hochschulen los? Eine ökonomische Analyse, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 78. Jg., S. 148–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • U.S. News (1999), Graduate School Rankings; hier zitiert nach der Internet-Version auf www.usnews.com vom 5. 3. 1999.

  • Wilson, Charles A. (1977), A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information, in: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 16, S. 167–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Winkler, D. R. (1987), Sceening Models and Education, in: Psacharopoulos, George (ed.), Economics of Education: Resarch and Studies, S. 287–291.

  • Winston, Gordon C. (1999), Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, S. 17–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolpin, Kenneth I. (1977), Education and Screening, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 67, S. 949–958.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woll, Artur (1994), Hochschulpolitik am Scheideweg, in: Das Wirtschaftsstudium, 23. Jg., S. 171–172.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Universität Zürich, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032, Zürich, Schweiz

    Egon Franck

  2. Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere für Industriebetriebslehre, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Lessingstraße 45, D-09596, Freiberg/Sachsen, Deutschland

    Christian Opitz

Authors
  1. Egon Franck
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Christian Opitz
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Bedanken möchten wir uns bei einem anonymen Gutachter, der uns auf Mängel hingewiesen und mit vielseitigen Anregungen zu einer Verbesserung dieses Beitrages beigetragen hat.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Franck, E., Opitz, C. Zur Funktion von Studiengebühren angesichts von Informationsasymmetrien auf Humankapitalmärkten. Schmalenbachs Z betriebswirtsch Forsch 53, 91–106 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03372643

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03372643

JEL Classification

Search

Navigation