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Arrow’s impossibility theorem

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Abstract

In this article a number of voting models are considered and the drawbacks of each are indicated. The aim is to develop a voting method, which is based on individual preferences and which finally represents the choice of society. Arrow’s theorem addresses this problem.

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Suggested Reading

  1. Arrow, Kenneth J,Social Choice and Individual Values, John Wiley NY, 1951.Address for Correspondence

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  1. Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Science, 560 012, Bangalore, India

    Renuka Ravindran

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  1. Renuka Ravindran
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Ravindran, R. Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Reson 10, 18–26 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837642

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837642

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