Abstract
Our main result for finite games in extensive form is that strict determinacy for a playeri in a completely inflated game structure implies almost complete information for playeri, even if we allow for certain type of overlapping for information sets.
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Vasilescu, E.N. On extensive games and almost complete information. Int J Game Theory 7, 163–182 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769188
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769188