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A new index of power for simplen-person games

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Abstract

Measures of (a priori) power play a useful role in assessing the character of interpersonal interaction found in collective decision making bodies. We propose and axiomatically characterize an alternative power index to the familiarShapley/Shubik andBanzhaf indices which can be used for such purposes. The index presented is shown to be unique for the class of simplen-person games. By subsequent generalization of the index and its axioms to the class ofn-person games in characteristic function form we obtain an analog to theShapley value.

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Deegan, J., Packel, E.W. A new index of power for simplen-person games. Int J Game Theory 7, 113–123 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753239

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753239

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