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Choice of organizational form in the life insurance industry: New Zealand evidence

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Abstract

Two forms of ownership structure characterize the insurance industry—the stock company owned by shareholders and the mutual form which is owned by its policyholders. The academic literature suggests that ownership structure is dependent upon the efficiency of the endogenous contracting mechanisms and governance structures in firms. Mutuals are predicted to exist and successfully compete with stock companies in insurance markets because they merge the ownership-customer functions and introduceex-ante contracting mechanisms andex-post modes of governance which restrict managerial discretion. Drawing a framework from transaction cost theory, this study tests empirically the proposition that choice of ownership structure in the life insurance industry is related to contracting mechanisms and governance structures in the firm. Individual cross-sectional logistic regression models are estimated using 1991–1993 data gathered from New Zealand's life insurance industry. Consistent with expectations our results suggest that mutuals are more likely to have higher asset specificity than stock companies. By contrast, stocks appear to be more reinsured and incur higher governance expenditures than mutual companies. Furthermore, contrary to what was hypothesized, our findings indicate that mutuals may be bigger than stock companies. Therefore, overall the empirical evidence does not support the predictions drawn from transaction cost theory.

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Authors
  1. Mike Adams
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  2. Mahmud Hossain
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Additional information

The authors are lecturers, Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Glasgow, and Department of Accountancy, Massey University, New Zealand, respectively.

The authors thank Lars Hassel, Leung Hing-Man, Bill Maughan, Mike Pickford, Kulwant Singh and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on original drafts of this paper. However, they are solely responsible for any errors or omissions that remain. They also appreciate the cooperation of members of New Zealand's life insurance industry for supplying information. Finally, the financial support of Price Waterhouse (Wellington, New Zealand) is gratefully acknowledged.

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Adams, M., Hossain, M. Choice of organizational form in the life insurance industry: New Zealand evidence. Asia Pacific J Manage 13, 19–35 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01739680

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