Abstract
This paper considers hypergraph communication situations, where for a group of agents the economic possibilities are described by a coalitional game and the communication possibilities are described by a hypergraph in which the nodes are the agents and the edges are the subgroups of agents who can effect communication. Axiomatic characterizations are provided for two allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aumann RJ, Myerson RB (1988) Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: an application of the Shapley value. In: The Shapley Value, Roth AB (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 175–191.
Berge C (1989) Hypergraphs. North-Holland, Mathematical library, pp. 1–3, 155–162.
Borm PEM, Owen G, Tijs SH (1991) On the position value for communication situations. To appear in SIAM J. on Disc. Math.
Meessen R (1988) Communication games. Master's Thesis (in Dutch), Department of Mathematics, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Myerson RB (1977) Graphs and cooperation in games. Math. Oper. Res. 2, 225–229.
Myerson RB (1980) Conference structures and fair allocation rules. Intern. J. of Game Theory 9, 169–182.
Owen G (1986) Values of graph-restricted games. SIAM J. Alg. Disc. Meth. 7, 210–220.
Shapley LS (1953) A value forn-person games. Annals of Math. Studies 28, 307–317.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
van den Nouweland, A., Borm, P. & Tijs, S. Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations. Int J Game Theory 20, 255–268 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01253780
Received:
Revised:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01253780