Abstract
In this paper I analyze whether the generalized Nash solution which has been defined by Harsanyi and Selten for bargaining problems with incomplete information can be characterized in the mechanism framework introduced by Myerson.
I show that the solution is uniquely determined by a set of axioms in the case of independently distributed types. It can be seen that the axioms given by Harsanyi and Selten cannot be used if the types are not independently distributed.
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References
Aumann RJ (1976) Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4, 1236–1239.
Harsanyi JC, Selten R (1972) A generalized Nash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete information. Management Science 18, 80–106.
Myerson RB (1979) Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47, 61–73.
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Myerson RB (1984) Two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. Econometrica 52, 461–487.
Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162.
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The contents of this paper is part of my dissertation at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Bielefeld. I would like to thank my thesis advisors Prof. Dr. J. Rosenmüller and Prof. Dr. W. Trockel for many helpful hints and all the members of the IMW for fruitful discussions.
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Weidner, F. The generalized Nash bargaining solution and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms. Int J Game Theory 21, 109–129 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245455
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245455