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Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining

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Abstract

We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with then-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the “continuation probability,” ϱ. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (a) small values of ϱ and (b) large values of ϱ. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of ϱ is provided.

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References

  • Hart S, Mas-Colell A (1992) A model ofn-person noncooperative bargaining. Economie Theory Discussion Paper 7, Harvard Institute of Economie Research, Harvard University Cambridge MA. Revised version (1994) entittled Bargaining and Value

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, 608 Kern Graduate Building, 16802-3306, University Park, PA, USA

    Vijay Krishna

  2. Department of Economics, Brown University, 02912, Providence, RI, USA

    Roberto Serrano

Authors
  1. Vijay Krishna
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  2. Roberto Serrano
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Additional information

We are grateful to Andreu Mas-Colell for help and encouragement and to two referees for every helpful comments.

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Krishna, V., Serrano, R. Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining. Int J Game Theory 24, 259–272 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01243155

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01243155

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