Abstract
A “restriction” is a monotonic projection assigning to each coalition of a finite player setN a subcoalition. On the class of transferable utility games with player setN, a Shapley value is associated with each restriction by replacing, in the familiar probabilistic formula, each coalition by the subcoalition assigned to it. Alternatively, such a Shapley value can be characterized by restricted dividends. This method generalizes several other approaches known in literature. The main result is an axiomatic characterization with the property that the restriction is determined endogenously by the axioms.
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Derks, J., Peters, H. A shapley value for games with restricted coalitions. Int J Game Theory 21, 351–360 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240150
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240150