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Sharing cost information: a counterexample

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Kentucky, 40506, Lexington, KY, USA

    Richard Jensen

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  1. Richard Jensen
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I thank David K. Levine for several suggestions which helped to sharpen the focus of this paper. This research was supported by the College of Business and Economics of the University of Kentucky under an Ashland Oil Summer Research Grant, the National Science Foundation under Grant No. RII-8610671, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky under the Kentucky EPSCoR Program.

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Jensen, R. Sharing cost information: a counterexample. Econ Theory 3, 589–592 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01209706

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01209706

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