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Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why

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  1. Department of Philosophy 438 General Classroom Building, University of Missouri-Columbia, 65211, Columbia, MO, USA

    Andrew Melnyk

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Melnyk, A. Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why. Philos Stud 74, 221–241 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989804

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