Abstract
In general, it is clear that open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium do not coincide. In this paper, we study the structure of differential games and develop a technique using which we can identify classes of games for which the open-loop Nash equilibrium is a degenerate feedback equilibrium. This technique clarifies the relationship between the assumptions made on the structure of the game and the resultant equilibrium.
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Communicated by G. Leitmann
The author would like to thank E. Dockner, A. Mehlmann, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
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Fershtman, C. Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium. J Optim Theory Appl 55, 217–231 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00939082
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00939082