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A power rule for social choice

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Abstract

Recognizing that all social choice takes place in the context of some status quo, the social choice process is modeled as a sequence of challenges to the status quo. In order to mount a successful challenge, the proponents of change must generate sufficient power to overcome the status quo. Power is viewed as an amalgam of economic, political and more general social power — such as the ability to communicate and shape public opinion. Individual power expresses both the ability and the desire to influence outcomes and, as such, varies from individual to individual as well as from social state to social state for each individual.

Existence of equilibrium under a power rule is established, and stability of equilibrium is discussed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University Plaza, Georgia State University, 30303, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

    R. Saposnik

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  1. R. Saposnik
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Saposnik, R. A power rule for social choice. Soc Choice Welfare 1, 97–103 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00452881

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00452881

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