Abstract
We raise two objections to Slote’s article. First, empathy cannot provide information about the world in the direct way Slote proposes. Emotional contagion might be able to do so, but this type of process is different from the empathic one. Second, even if we accept his view of empathy, his claim that we make moral judgments via empathizing with the ‘warmth’ or ‘coldness’ of the actor seems misguided because, we usually empathize with the patient (not the actor), and we empathize with emotions, not “temperatures”.
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Notes
Though Ekman, throughout his career, added more emotions to the list, this is controversial and still not close to including all emotions. Furthermore, we are not consistently accurate at recognizing emotions.
When describing empathic bias, Hoffman says: “Although people tend to respond empathically to almost anyone in distress, they are vulnerable to bias in favor of victims who are…similar to themselves; and to bias victims who are present in the immediate situation.” (p. 14)
In his response to D’Arms: Slote (2011)
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Furlane, K., Maibom, H.L. Empathy is Not a Thermometer. Philosophia 45, 861–866 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9827-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9827-y