Abstract
While epistemologists routinely employ disbelief talk, it is not clear that they really mean it, given that they often equate disbelieving p with believing ¬p. I argue that this is a mistake—disbelief is a doxastic attitude of rejection and is distinct from belief (and withholding). I first clarify this claim and its opposition, then show that we must distinguish disbelieving p from believing ¬p in order to account for the fact that we continue to hold doxastic attitudes toward propositions that we reject. After defending this argument against some possible objections, I examine several cases that reveal disbelieving p to be not only non-identical to believing ¬p, but independent of that attitude as well. Finally, I sketch some immediate and potential consequences of recognizing disbelief as a distinct doxastic attitude, particularly for work on epistemic rationality.
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Notes
Throughout, this term refers to “outright” doxastic attitudes, as opposed to degrees of belief or confidence or to credences (though these make an appearance in Sect. 3.2).
We will not draw any distinctions among withholding (belief or judgment), suspension (of belief or judgment), or agnosticism. (See also n. 7.).
In conversation, Turri has said that he was thinking of the substantive claim, but that given that his arguments do not depend on it, his statement of the traditional view can reasonably be read as also covering the Negated Content Approach discussed below.
I take ¬p, it is false that p, it is not the case that p, etc. to be equivalent, and we will not distinguish among them, except in Sect. 5.3, when considering the possibility of holding distinct attitudes toward ¬p and p is false.
This is less than ideal, as ‘entertains’ normally indicates a certain sort of mental activity. On our stipulative use, however, it does not imply that the agent consciously considers p. One entertains p whenever one is in a position to believe p (whether by holding an occurrent or dispositional belief that p), whatever relationship that entails.
The neutrality ascribed to withholding here is broad, covering anything between rejection and acceptance. (Compare Roderick Chisholm’s (1976) explication of withholding h as “not accepting h and not accepting ¬h” (p. 27).) Some authors take withholding to require something in addition to this broad neutrality (e.g. Friedman (2013b)) and/or propose additional neutral attitudes (e.g. Turri (2012) and (McGrath 2020), though McGrath’s additions are non-doxastic). These differences will not matter below, given the choice of cases and our focus on disbelief.
E.g. (Leitgeb 2013).
E.g. (Churchland and Churchland 1998).
Here, I am setting aside the Lewis/Stalnaker view of content. In its simplest form, at least, there is no distinction between a ¬¬p-belief and a p-belief, since ¬¬p and p are true in the same set of possible worlds While I attempt to remain as metaphysically neutral as possible, I take this simple version of the view to be sufficiently problematic and unpopular to safely ignore. An investigation into whether and how the points of this subsection might be made on more sophisticated versions would take us too far afield. (Thanks to Declan Smithies for suggesting this clarification.).
There is a more general graspability issue as well, given that this interpretation is not restricted to rejection of singly negated propositions. Plausibly, the negation of a proposition is more complex than that proposition itself. By iterating negation, then, any (finite) agent will reach a proposition (¬… ¬p) that they are able to entertain and reject, but whose negation is beyond their grasp. (This point is based on an argument for belief-credence dualism by Elizabeth Jackson (ms.).)
This way of putting the matter is taken from (Friedman 2013a, 2019). There, she argues that when one inquires one holds an “interrogative attitude” toward a question (e.g. wondering whether), and belief is an attitude that settles inquiry such that one no longer holds the question-directed attitude. Presumably, when one rejects ¬p one settles a question as well, and so if the question of whether p can remain open, that rejection is not in virtue of believing p. Importantly, however, I do not wish to rely on Friedman’s account here. Rather, I take it to provide a potential explanation of the strength of the intuition to which I am appealing.
I address questions about the possibility of conforming one’s attitudes to principles of deviant logics in Sects. 4.3 and 5.2. In this case, note that the problem stands so long as it is possible for an intuitionistic reasoner to focus on the question of whether ¬p or ¬¬p such that, if their rejection of ¬p consists in forming some belief, it is the belief that ¬¬p. (Perhaps they would automatically form the belief that p as well, but only as an inference, even if unconscious.) .
The point is particularly clear if we put the matter a bit more formally. On the Negated Content Approach, the only two doxastic attitudes one can hold toward a proposition, p, are belief (Bp) and withholding (Wp). Therefore, where Np is not having a doxastic attitude toward p: (¬Bp ˄ ¬Wp) → Np. By definition, atheists such as Alfred neither believe nor withhold on g, God exists. (¬Bg ˄ ¬Wg) → Ng. On the Negated Content Approach, atheist-Alfred holds no attitude toward God exists. (Of course, he does believe God does not exist (B¬g), but, obviously, ¬g ≠ g.).
In Sect. 4 I consider (and reject) the response that in believing ¬p one holds a doxastic attitude toward p. For now, I simply note that the idea that doxastic rejection consists in holding an attitude of acceptance seems odd, to put it mildly.
Thanks to Kenneth Boyce for the suggestion and significant discussion of this interpretation.
As discussed in Sect. 2.2, the most plausible interpretation of the Negated Content Approach treats ¬p-disbeliefs as either disguised p-beliefs or disguised ¬¬p-beliefs, and it is implausible to think that one believes ¬¬p whenever one believes p (see n. 11).
Excepting, perhaps, the acceptance-rejection relationship discussed in Sect. 4.3.
While complex propositions are standardly those involving two or more constituent propositions, for our purposes they include any proposition that involves a logical operator and a constituent proposition.
See (Audi 1994).
It might be objected that this construal is misleading—p is part of the content of a belief that ¬p, even if it is not the object of acceptance for that attitude. However, this is basically to take p as an “ipso facto object” of belief that ¬p, and we have already seen the problems with that approach. (Thanks to Declan Smithies for flagging this consideration.).
At this point, of course, the rejection we are considering is not ipso facto, but we can always find a more appropriate name should the strategy prove out.
Indeed, it is a problem for any version of the Negated Content Approach. However, its relevance is most straightforward in the context of the Ipso Facto Rejection Thesis.
See (Priest 2008, §6.5).
It is worth noting that even allowing for beliefs of this sort puts pressure on the defender of the Ipso Facto Rejection Thesis to reject all ipso facto attitudes. I suspect that they would be inclined to accept the most intuitive examples, such as ipso facto belief in the conjuncts of a believed conjunction. Such intuitions would seem to extend to beliefs of the form p ∧ q is a true conjunction. Yet if ipso facto rejection defenders allow that the latter form yields ipso facto belief in the conjuncts, they must add, “unless the conjuncts are known to be contradictory.” This seems ad hoc, and, given the small difference between belief that p ∧ q and belief that p ∧ q is a true conjunction, it appears more appropriate to reject ipso facto attitudes altogether.
This is a variation on an argument by Priest (2006, pp. 96–97).
See (Dummett 1978, pp. 14–16). While Dummett’s original example is given in terms of assertion and denial, rather than belief and disbelief, he explicitly introduces it by noting that even those who reject the correspondence theory of truth often remain realist in their thinking.
The details of this connection needn’t concern us here.
See n. 4.
This might be the case if, as is not implausible, the objects of propositional attitudes are actually something more fine-grained than propositions, such as Fregean senses.
Riley would also form a contrary color-belief to r65, but it would be that the’65 Corvette was blue, since the blueness of the car would be a highly salient color-feature of his mental image, while the non-redness would not.
At least, this is the case in most situations. The point is not fully general, due to some obscure possibilities. For example, T could more strongly favor believing ¬p for S if an oracle has told them that if they receive any testimony about p, then they rationally ought to believe ¬p.
Thanks to Ethan Brauer and Evan Thomas for suggesting that disbelief might be relevant to such cases.
In the sense that I am using this phrase, one “way that the world is”, is that it is not-other-ways. These are the features of the world represented by negation-beliefs.
Recent discussion in this area (e.g. (Littlejohn 2018) and (Worsnip 2018), among others) has focused almost exclusively on “inter-level” conflicts, and especially the possibility of epistemic akrasia. In this case, the relevant constraint would be first-order (e.g. Rationality requires that if one withholds on p, then one does not believe or disbelieve ¬p).
I am indebted to many for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts of this paper, including Ethan Brauer, Liz Jackson, Matthew McGrath, Andrew Moon, Declan Smithies, Brian Weatherson, Evan T. Woods, and especially Kenneth Boyce. The paper has also significantly benefited from comments by several anonymous reviewers.
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Acknowledgements
I am indebted to many for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts of this paper, including Ethan Brauer, Liz Jackson, Matthew McGrath, Andrew Moon, Declan Smithies, Brian Weatherson, Evan T. Woods, and especially Kenneth Boyce. The paper has also significantly benefited from comments by several anonymous reviewers.
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Smart, J.A. Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude. Synthese 198, 11797–11813 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02830-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02830-w