Abstract
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie) about each pair of options. The proposed method is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet–Smith principle, and clone consistency. One can view this rating method as a complement for the ranking method introduced in 1997 by Markus Schulze. It is also related to certain methods of cluster analysis and one-dimensional scaling.
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Camps, R., Mora, X. & Saumell, L. A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case. Soc Choice Welf 39, 141–170 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0548-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0548-z