Skip to main content
Log in

The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We associate an optimistic TU game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N\S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bergantiños G, Lorenzo L (2004) A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem. Math Methods Operat Res 59:393–403

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergantiños G, Vidal-Puga JJ (2005a) A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Mimeo. Available from the authors on request

  • Bergantiños G, Vidal-Puga JJ (2005b) Several approaches to the same rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Mimeo. Available from the authors on request

  • Bird CG (1976) On cost allocation for a spanning tree: a game theoretic approach. Networks 6:335–350

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Branzei R, Moretti S, Norde H, Tijs S (2004) The P-value for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree situations. Theory Decisi 56:47–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chun Y (2006) A pessimisic approach to the queuing problem. Math soc Sci 51:171–181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dutta B, Kar A (2004) Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games. Games Econ Behav 48:223–248

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feltkamp V, Tijs S, Muto S (1994) On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligation rule of minimum cost extension problems. Mimeo. Tilburg University

  • Granot D, Huberman G (1981) Minimum cost spanning tree games. Math Program 21:1–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Granot D, Huberman G (1984) On the core and nucleolus of the minimum cost spanning tree games. Math Program 29:323–347

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kalai E, Samet D (1987) On weighted Shapley values. Int J Game Theory 16:205–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kar A (2002) Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games. Games Econ Behav 38:265–277

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kruskal J (1956) On the shortest spanning subtree of a graph and the traveling salesman problem. Proc Am Math Soc 7:48–50

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maniquet F (2003) A characterization of the Shapley value in queuing problems. J Econ Theory 109:90–103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Myerson RB (1980) Conference structures and fair allocation rules. Int J Game Theory 9:169–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prim RC (1957) Shortest connection networks and some generalizations. Bell Syst Technol J 36:1389–1401

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson W (2003) Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. Math Soc Sci 45:249–297

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gustavo Bergantiños.

Additional information

We thank Hervé Moulin, William Thomson, and two referees for helpful comments. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia and FEDER through grant SEJ2005-07637-c02-01 is gratefully acknowledged.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J. The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Int J Game Theory 36, 223–239 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0069-7

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0069-7

Keywords

Navigation