Abstract
We associate an optimistic TU game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N\S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.
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We thank Hervé Moulin, William Thomson, and two referees for helpful comments. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia and FEDER through grant SEJ2005-07637-c02-01 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J. The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Int J Game Theory 36, 223–239 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0069-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0069-7