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Belief revision through the belief-function formalism in a multi-agent environment

  • Part IV: Theories
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Intelligent Agents III Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL 1996)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1193))

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Abstract

The abilities of detecting contradictions and rearranging the cognitive space in order to cope with them are important to be embedded in the BDI architecture of an agent acting in a complex and dynamic world. However, to be accomplished in a multi-agent environment, “belief revision” must depart considerably from its original definitions. According to us, the main changes should be the following ones:

  1. 1.

    replacing the “priority to the incoming information principle” with the “recoverability principle”: any previously believed piece of information must belong to the current cognitive state whenever it is possible

  2. 2.

    dealing not just with pieces of information but with couples <source, information> since the reliability of the source affects the credibility of the information and vice-versa.

The “belief-function” formalism is here accepted as a simple and intuitive way to transfer the sources' reliability to the information's credibility.

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Jörg P. Müller Michael J. Wooldridge Nicholas R. Jennings

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dragoni, A.F., Giorgini, P. (1997). Belief revision through the belief-function formalism in a multi-agent environment. In: Müller, J.P., Wooldridge, M.J., Jennings, N.R. (eds) Intelligent Agents III Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages. ATAL 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1193. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0013580

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0013580

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-62507-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68057-4

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