Résumé
La théorie économique apporte maintenant des éléments de réflexion pour la conception des choix ďintégration. Cet article non technique dresse une liste de questions sur la technologie et la structure de ľindustrie auxquelles une analyse économique rigoureuse desstratégies structurelles se doit de répondre. Il passe en revue les deux motivations classiques de ľintégration verticale: ľefficacité et la stratégie de marché (forclusion). Sans chercher à tirer des conclusions définitives, qui exigeraient une étude beaucoup plus documentée que celle-ci, ľarticle suggère comment les nouvelles théories pourraient être appliquées à ľindustrie des télécommunications.
Abstract
Economic theory now has a conceptual framework in which alternatives in the matter of vertical integration can be compared. This nontechnical paper lists questions about technology and industry structure that must be addressed by a careful design of a structural strategy. It reviews the two common motivations for vertical integration: efficiency and foreclosure. The paper does not draw any firm conclusion for the telecommunications industry (this would require a much more detailed analysis), but suggest how modern economic theory could be applied to shed light on this industry.
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Tirole, J. Les idées nouvelles sur ľintégration verticale: un guide informel de ľutilisateur. Ann. Télécommun. 50, 256–264 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02999998
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02999998
Mots clés
- Théorie économique
- Industrie télécommunication
- Stratégie entreprise
- Profit
- Prise décision
- Fournisseur
- Innovation
- Groupement entreprise