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Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games

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Abstract

In this paper we consider the question of existence of a multicriteria-Nash equilibrium in multicriteria multistage N-person games. Besides, we present several forms of multicriteria-Nash equilibrium for repeated games both with infinitely and finitely many stages.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Applied Mathematics, St. Petersburg State University, 198904, Petrodivorets, St. Petersburg, Russia

    L. Petrosjan

  2. Facultad de Matemáticas, Universidad de Sevilla, 41012, Sevilla, Spain

    J. Puerto

Authors
  1. L. Petrosjan
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  2. J. Puerto
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Additional information

The author thanks the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through grant number BFM01-2378.

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Petrosjan, L., Puerto, J. Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games. Top 10, 275–287 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579020

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579020

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