Abstract
We consider a model of Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information like chess or checkers. The evolution is viewed as a sequence of strategies, each of which wins over its immediate predecessor. We argue that the intelligence level of strategies need not necessarily increase during this type of evolution.
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Kůrka, P. Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information. Biol. Cybernetics 55, 281–288 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02281974
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02281974