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Ecotypic variation in the asymmetric Hawk-Dove game: When is Bourgeois an evolutionarily stable strategy?

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This paper develops a mathematical model of an iterated, asymmetric Hawk-Dove game with the novel feature that not only are successive pairs of interactants — in the roles of owner and intruder contesting a site — drawn randomly from the population, but also the behaviour adopted at one interaction affects the role of a contestant in the next. Under the assumption that a site is essential for reproduction, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the population is found to depend on the probability, w, that the game will continue for at least a further period (which is inversely related to predation risk), and five other parameters; two of them are measures of site scarcity, two are measures of fighting costs, and the last is a measure of resource holding potential (RHP). Among the four strategies — Hawk (H), Dove (D), Bourgeois (B) and anti-Bourgeois (X) — only D is incapable of being an ESS; and regions of parameter space are found in which the ESS can be only H, or only X, or only B; or either H or X; or either X or B; or either H or B; or any of the three. The scarcer the sites or the lower the costs of fighting, or the lower the value of w, the more likely it is that H is an ESS; the more abundant the sites or the higher the costs of fighting, or the higher the value of w, the more likely it is that X or B is an ESS. The different ESSs are interpreted as different ecotypes. The analysis suggests how a non-fighting population could evolve from a fighting population under decreasing risk of predation. If there were no RHP, or if RHP were low, then the ESS in the non-fighting population would be X; only if RHP were sufficiently high would the ESS be B, and the scarcer the sites, the higher the RHP would have to be. These conclusions support the thesis that if long-term territories are essential for reproduction and sites are scarce, then ownership is ruled out not only as an uncorrelated asymmetry for settling disputes in favour of owner, but also as a correlated asymmetry.

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Mesterton-Gibbons, M. Ecotypic variation in the asymmetric Hawk-Dove game: When is Bourgeois an evolutionarily stable strategy?. Evol Ecol 6, 198–222 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02214162

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