Abstract
Dynamic systems of differential inclusions, leading to the appropriate bargaining sets, are introduced. Stability properties of these systems are studied.
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Yarom, M. Dynamic systems of differential inclusions for the bargaining sets. Int J Game Theory 14, 51–61 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770227
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770227