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Monotonic games are spanning network games

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Abstract

Spanning network games, which are a generalization of minimum cost spanning tree games, were introduced by Granot and Maschler (1991), who showed that these games are always monotonic. In this paper a subclass of spanning network games is introduced, namely simplex games, and it is shown that every monotonic game is a simplex game. Hence, the class of spanning network games coincides with the class of monotonic games.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Anne Van Den Nouweland & Stef Tijs

  2. Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University, 91904, Jerusalem, Israel

    Michael Maschler

Authors
  1. Anne Van Den Nouweland
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  2. Stef Tijs
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  3. Michael Maschler
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Additional information

Financial support of the CentER for Economic Research of the Department of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, is gratefully acknowledged.

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Van Den Nouweland, A., Tijs, S. & Maschler, M. Monotonic games are spanning network games. Int J Game Theory 21, 419–427 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240156

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240156

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