Abstract
We address the question of which production decisions are reached via shareholder voting, if the firm's shareholders disagree. The median-voter approach is applied. Three dichotomies are explored: the one-man-one-vote versus the one-share-one-vote rule, naive versus sophisticated investors, before- versus after-trade voting. Novel asymptotic results are obtained.
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Geraats, P.M.W.A., Haller, H.H. Shareholders' choice. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 68, 111–135 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237187
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237187