Abstract
Under standard assumptions equilibria with three parties normally do not exist in spatial models of electoral competition. In this paper I show that such equilibria are possible if it is assumed that voters are uncertain about the exact policies parties will adopt once elected. Substantive predictions can be derived from the model, explaining some features of three-party competition. First, the least risk party will always take the most moderate position. Second, this position is also winning. Third, the two riskier parties are always on opposite sides of the median voter and also of the moderate party.
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This is a heavily revised version of the paper “Uncertainty and New Political Parties,” prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago 1992. Thanks to Chris Achen, Jeff Banks, Lars-Erik Cederman, Douglas Dion, Joel Kaji, Martin Osborne, Gerald Schneider and an anonymous reviewer for their extremely helpful remarks. While almost all interesting and important ideas of this paper are theirs, the remaining errors, shortcomings and not-so-good ideas are all mine.
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Hug, S. Third parties in equilibrium. Public Choice 82, 159–180 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047735
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047735