Abstract
A model of collective bargaining in differential games, similar to one considered by Leitmann (Ref. 1), is proposed. Optimal threat strategies are then found and compared with Leitmann's solution. Nash-optimal threat strategies are also found and compared with the other two solutions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Leitmann, G.,Collective Bargaining: a Differential Game, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1973.
Leitmann, G., Private Communication, 1979.
Ray, A., andBlaquiere, A.,Sufficient Conditions for Optimality of Threat Strategies in a Differential Game, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1981.
Liu, P. T.,Optimal Threat Strategies in Differential Games, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1973.
Blaquiere, A., Juricek, L., andWiese, K. E.,Geometry of Pareto Equilibria in N-Person Differential Games, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1972.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Communicated by G. Leitmann
The author would like to thank Professor G. Leitmann of the University of California for bringing the author's attention to this subject.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ray, A. Optimal threat strategies in collective bargaining. J Optim Theory Appl 33, 111–120 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935180
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935180