Abstract
Elimination Procedures generated by marginal contribution in an integer veto function implement through sincere (respectively sincere and sophisticated) behavior the core correspondence of the veto function if the latter is convex (respectively additive). Moreover a partial converse of this result is proved. A characterization of a subclass of convex (respectively additive) veto functions is thus obtained.
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I am indebted to Hervé Moulin for helpful comments concerning this paper. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for his remarks.
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Abdou, J. Convexity of integer veto and Elimination Procedures. Soc Choice Welfare 6, 63–70 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433364
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433364