Abstract
To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence ‘ — does not expression a true proposition’ are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.
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Sobel, J.H. Lies, lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions. Philosophical Studies 67, 51–69 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355229
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355229