Skip to main content
Log in

Cores and capacities of compound simple games

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We provide an exact formula for the Nakamura number of a compound simple game. Also, we investigate the capacity of compound games. In particular, we show that if the components are not weak, then the capacity of the compound game is 2.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Holzman R (1986) The capacity of a committee. Math Soc Sci 12:139–157

    Google Scholar 

  2. Owen G (1982) Game theory, 2nd edn. Academic Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  3. Nakamura K (1979) The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences. Int J Game Theory 8:55–61

    Google Scholar 

  4. Peleg B (1984) Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  5. Shapley LS (1962) Simple games: An outline of the descriptive theory. Behav Sci 7:59–66

    Google Scholar 

  6. Shapley LS (1964) Solutions of compound simple games. In: Advances in game theory, annals of mathematics studies, Vol. 52, pp 267–305. Dresher M, Shapley LS, Tucker AW (eds) Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

I am grateful to R. Holzman for some helpful remarks.

The first version of this paper was written when the author was visiting the Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Peleg, B. Cores and capacities of compound simple games. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 307–316 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00286871

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00286871

Keywords

Navigation