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I am grateful to Tommy Tan and Philip Reny for helping me appreciate the importance of common knowledge in games, and to Jon Elster and Michael Woodford for many useful comments. Financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES 87-10209 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Bicchieri, C. Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge. Erkenntnis 30, 69–85 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00184816
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00184816